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HOW TO READ INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW: STRICT CONSTRUCTION AND THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT
CAROLINE DAVIDSON†
INTRODUCTION
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(“ICC”)1 espouses a commitment to the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege (no crime without law)2 including the guarantees
that crime definitions will be strictly construed and not be
extended by analogy, and ambiguities will be construed in favor
of the defendant. Gone are the days of watered down legality in
the face of horrendous crimes, or so it seems on the face of the
document.3 At the same time that the Rome Statute announces
its commitment to legality, it also provides a hierarchy of legal
sources judges are to consider. These sources are many and
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1
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 9, July 17, 1998, 2187
U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
2
See generally Beth Van Schaack, Crimen Sine Lege: Judicial Lawmaking at
the Intersection of Law and Morals, 97 GEO. L.J. 119, 121 (2008) (describing the
history of nullum crimen sine lege and how this principle is applied today).
3
See id. at 192 (“Positive law, in the form of the ICC Statute, now reflects
developments in the law made at the expense of perfect legal certainty. Now that the
universe of international criminal law has settled in, the need for expansive
interpretation is diminishing and the full complement of the principle of legality can
take root.”).
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varied and include not only the Rome Statute and other ICC
documents but also general principles of international law and
general principles derived from national legal systems.
These provisions on strict construction and sources of law
are hard to reconcile. The abundance of often-divergent sources
of law seems to assure that ambiguity is either everywhere or
nowhere. Add to this picture the backdrop of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties (“Vienna Convention”), which
potentially adds yet another set of sources and tools judges are to
turn to when interpreting the Rome Statute’s crimes definitions.
The ICC’s commitment to legality and strict construction is
unprecedented in international criminal law (“ICL”).
The
Nuremberg trials were notoriously lax on the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege, particularly with the invention of the new
crimes of crimes against the peace and crimes against humanity,
and therefore, unsurprisingly, the notion of strict construction
gained no traction.4 The ad hoc tribunals5 contained nothing in
their statutes related to nullum crimen sine lege, but largely
voiced support for the principle in their judgments.6
Despite a professed commitment to legality, the ad hoc
tribunals eschewed strict construction in all but a few cases
where the cost of recognizing the principle was low.7 The judges

4
The big legality concern at Nuremberg was that crimes against the peace and
crimes against humanity had not previously been defined as crimes in international
law. The Nuremberg judges both dodged the issue by saying that it was not
jurisdictional and argued that the conduct had been condemned, albeit not explicitly
criminalized, previously. Göring’s lawyer also made, unsuccessfully, the lenity or in
dubio pro reo argument that an ambiguity in the statute ought to be construed in his
client’s favor. See KENNETH S. GALLANT, THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE CRIMINAL LAW 67–68, 107–08 (2009).
5
The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) are often referred to as
the “ad hoc” tribunals due to their temporary and conflict-specific nature.
6
See GALLANT, supra note 4, at 304; see also Prosecutor v. Galic, Case No. IT98-29-T, Judgement and Opinion, ¶ 93 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Dec. 5, 2003), (stating that the effect of nullum crimen sine lege is “ ‘that penal
statutes must be strictly construed’ and that the ‘paramount duty of the judicial
interpreter [is] to read into the language of the legislature, honestly and faithfully,
its plain and rational meaning and to promote its object’ ” and that ambiguities that
cannot be resolved with resort to canons of construction instead should be resolved
in favor of the accused) (citing Prosecutor v. Delali, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement,
¶¶ 408, 413 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998)).
7
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 500–01
(Sept. 2, 1998) (choosing the more lenient interpretation of the law by saying that
genocide required intentional killing). This was no great loss for the prosecution,
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of the ad hoc tribunals were conflicted on whether any rule of
lenity or strict construction applied. Some judges invoked in
dubio pro reo (doubts favor the accused) for the proposition that
legal ambiguities be read in favor of the defendant.8 Others,
however, insisted that in dubio pro reo only applied to findings of
fact.9 Even the judges who recognized the principle of strict
construction of the law generally allowed a very limited role for
it. They cabined the principle by putting it last, after all other
tools of interpretation had been exhausted, and by reducing it to
a bare formula of foreseeability, borrowed from the European
Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”), which permitted expansive
interpretation10 and application of legal principles to new factual
circumstances.11
since the Rwandan genocide did not proceed through recklessness or negligence but
rather through brutal, intentional killing. See also Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case No.
IT-02-60-T, Judgement, ¶ 642 n.2057 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Jan. 17, 2005) [hereinafter Blagojevic Trial Judgement] (noting that “[i]n accordance
with the general principle of interpretation in dubio pro reo, the Tribunals’ case law
has opted for the interpretation most favourable to the accused and found that the
term ‘killings’, in the context of a genocide charge, must be interpreted as referring
to the definition of murder, i.e. intentional homicide”) (citing Prosecutor v.
Kayishema, Case No. ICTR-95-1-A, Appeal Judgement, ¶ 151 (June 1, 2001)
(concluding that there was little difference between killing and “meurtre,” but, even
if there were, it still did not help the defendant)). Likewise, in Blagojevic, no one
contended that the 7000 men and boys killed were killed unintentionally. Blagojevic
Trial Judgement, ¶ 151. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 50 (2d ed. 2008) (discussing the “principle of favoring the accused,” known in
the United States as the lenity canon, and these two cases).
8
See supra text accompanying notes 6–7.
9
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-T, Judgement, ¶ 416 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 31, 2003) (“The Trial Chamber explicitly
distances itself from the Defence submission that the principle in dubio pro reo
should apply as a principle for the interpretation of the substantive criminal law of
the Statute. As this principle is applicable to findings of fact and not of law, the Trial
Chamber has not taken it into account in its interpretation of the law.”). The
Appeals Chamber did not adopt this narrow reading of in dubio pro reo. Id. ¶ 417.
10
See William A. Schabas, Interpreting the Statutes of the Ad Hoc Tribunals, in
MAN’S INHUMANITY TO MAN: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF
ANTONIO CASSESE 849, 877 (Lal Chand Vohrah et al. eds., 2003) (citing Prosecutor v.
Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1-A, Appeals Judgement, ¶ 127 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000)) (stating that the legality principle “does not
prevent a court, either at the national or international level, from determining an
issue through a process of interpretation and clarification as to the elements of a
particular crime”); Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on
Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction – Joint Criminal Enterprise,
¶¶ 37, 38 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2003) (“[T]he
principle nullum crimen sine lege is, as noted by the International Military Tribunal
in Nuremberg, first and foremost, a ‘principle of justice’ . . . . This fundamental
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The ICC’s Rome Statute sets out the crimes over which the
ICC has jurisdiction and provides definitions of widely ranging
specificity for those crimes. An ICC document drafted after the
Rome Statute, the Elements of Crimes, defines the crimes in yet
greater detail. Still, uncertainty over the law and, specifically,
definitions of crimes and forms of criminal responsibility,
remains.12 Many legal questions have yet to be answered by any
international court. The ad hoc tribunals have answered others,
but the ICC is not bound by their law.
Others have discussed the broader issue of nullum crimen
sine lege,13 but until recently, there had been scant attention to
the interpretive components of the Rome Statute’s legality
guarantee. In the past few years, however, scholars have turned

principle ‘does not prevent a court from interpreting and clarifying the elements of a
particular crime’. Nor does it preclude the progressive development of the law by the
court. But it does prevent a court from creating new law or from interpreting existing
law beyond the reasonable limits of acceptable clarification. This Tribunal must
therefore be satisfied that the crime or the form of liability with which an accused is
charged was sufficiently foreseeable and that the law providing for such liability
must be sufficiently accessible at the relevant time, taking into account the
specificity of international law when making the assessment.”) (emphasis added).
See also Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of
Progressive Development of Law?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1007 (2004).
11
Prosecutor v. Hadz̆ihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Separate and
Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hunt Command Responsibility Appeal, ¶ 44,
n.66 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 16, 2003) (“A principle so held
to have been part of customary international law may . . . be applied to a new
situation where that situation reasonably falls within the application of the
principle.”). Judge Hunt invoked the object and purpose of Additional Protocol I and
IHL generally in favor of extending criminal responsibility for commanders for acts
committed by subordinates prior to the commander’s taking command. Id. ¶ 22.
12
See CASSESE, supra note 7, at 42–43 (stating that ICL remains
“decentralized” and “fragmentary,” and “the possibility frequently arises of a
contradictory and ‘cacophonic’ interpretation or application of international criminal
rules”); see also Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 189 (“[T]here are ‘legality deficits’
within the Statute, as many crimes are vaguely or sparingly worded and key terms
remain undefined, notwithstanding the Elements of Crimes.”).
13
Both Gallant and Van Schaack also explore strict construction and lenity as
part of their broader work on nullum crimen sine lege generally. Van Schaack, supra
note 2, at 176, 189 (discussing strict construction as a corollary of nullum crimen
sine lege). Gallant provides an extensive survey of domestic and international
jurisdictions vis-à-vis strict construction and the prohibition on analogy, and offers
observations on legality at the ICC. See discussion infra note 33. The Rome Statute
in fact puts its strict construction requirement in the provision on nullum crimen
sine lege, which makes sense. If judges construe offenses so broadly as to create new
crimes, they effectively are creating new law retroactively. GALLANT, supra note 4,
at 33.
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their attention to this important issue.14 This Article seeks to
build on this discussion by probing more deeply into the
justifications for strict construction and the other Article 22(2)
guarantees and assessing the extent to which they apply at the
ICC.
This Article seeks to answer a few seemingly simple
questions: What are strict construction, the ban on analogy, and
lenity under Article 22(2) of the Rome Statute, and what role do
and should they play in interpreting or making ICL? This
discussion is particularly salient in light of criticisms of
international criminal courts playing fast and loose with the law
in the name of “ending impunity”15 and important discussions
regarding the inherent tension between a liberal criminal justice
system and liberal human rights enforcement.16 Arguably,
lenity, strict construction, and the prohibition on defining crimes
by analogy are an important check against this illiberal
teleological approach to criminal law. As Professor Antonio
Cassese, a former President at the International Criminal

14
See generally Leila Nadya Sadat & Jarrod M. Jolly, Seven Canons of ICC
Treaty Interpretation: Making Sense of Article 25’s Rorschach Blot, 27 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. (UK) 755 (2014) (proposing canons of construction); Leena Grover, A Call to
Arms: Fundamental Dilemmas Confronting the Interpretation of Crimes in the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 543, 544 (2010)
[hereinafter Grover, A Call to Arms] (identifying “three fundamental interpretive
dilemmas” in the interpretation of the Rome Statute); LEENA GROVER,
INTERPRETING CRIMES IN THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT (2016) [hereinafter GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES].
15
See Göran Sluiter, Atrocity Crimes Litigation: Some Human Rights Concerns
Occasioned by Selected 2009 Case Law, 8 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 248, 257–58 (2010)
(noting the disturbing trend of using an “object and purpose” inquiry focused on
ending impunity to justify broad interpretations of crimes); Darryl Robinson, The
Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. (UK) 925, 928
(2008) [hereinafter Robinson, Identity Crisis] (discussing the conflict between
liberalism in human rights and humanitarian law enforcement and criminal law);
Benjamin Perrin, Searching for Law While Seeking Justice: The Difficulties of
Enforcing International Humanitarian Law in International Criminal Trials, 39
OTTAWA L. REV. 367, 385 (2007–2008) (discussing the tension between the goal of
maximizing humanitarian protection in armed conflict and respecting the
defendant’s right to a fair trial); Schabas, supra note 10, at 163 (noting the potential
free pass for expansive judicial lawmaking that the objects and purposes gives
judges); see also Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, The Pluralism of International
Criminal Law, 86 IND. L.J. 1063, 1073 (2011) (“Gaps in the law are an endemic
aspect of judicial decision making, but with ICL the gaps have at times appeared to
swallow the rules.”).
16
Robinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 15, at 927–32.
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Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) has stated, the
Rome Statute “seems to evince a certain mistrust
in . . . [j]udges.”17
The traditional justifications for strict construction,
imperfect even in the domestic context, are on shaky ground in
the international context. Other justifications for the canon,
however, including curbing arbitrary enforcement, encouraging
state participation in the Rome regime, and bolstering the court’s
gravity requirement, arguably support an even more robust role
for strict construction. This Article also flags the oddity of using
the doctrines of strict construction, lenity, and the prohibition on
analogy, principles that are meant for statutory construction, in
interpreting customary international law, which is notoriously
amorphous and unwritten.18 How exactly does one strictly
construe state practice and opinio juris? Ultimately, this Article
advocates a realistic but still robust version of the principle that
gives judges room for interpretation and development of the law,
yet avoids wholesale judicial crime creation. It argues that, even
though lenity—construing ambiguity in favor of defendants—is
unlikely to do much work at the ICC after courts consult Article
21 sources of law, there is independent meaning to the concept of
strict construction.19 Borrowing from the work of John Jeffries
on statutory interpretation, this Article argues that a better
conception of the Article 22(2) guarantee of strict construction is
an admonition to judges to avoid usurping the role of the

17
David Hunt, The International Criminal Court: High Hopes, ‘Creative
Ambiguity’ and an Unfortunate Mistrust in International Judges, 2 J. INT’L CRIM.
JUST. 56, 61 (2004) (stating that this puts it mildly and that “[i]t would be more
accurate to say that the Statute evinces a deep suspicion of the Court’s judges”).
18
Michael Wood (Special Rapporteur), Int’l Law Comm’n, First Report on
Formation and Evidence of Customary International Law, ¶ 21, A/CN.4/663 (May 17,
2013) [hereinafter ILC CIL 1] (noting “the inherent difficulties of the topic, primarily
the very nature of customary international law as unwritten law, and the ideological
and theoretical controversies that are often associated with it”); see also Dov Jacobs,
Positivism and International Criminal Law: The Principle of Legality as a Rule of
Conflict of Theories, (draft at 18), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=2046311 (noting that “[i]t is well known that difficulties arise in conceptualizing
this source, due to the fact . . . of its inherent circularity, given States need to act as
if it existed even before it did in order for it to exist”); Van Schaack, supra note 2, at
138 (arguing that “perfect positivism is impossible where customary international
law (CIL)—the practice of states bolstered by a sense of legal duty—remains an
integral source of ICL”).
19
Although this Article discusses Article 22(2)’s bar on analogy, the primary
focus is on lenity and strict construction.
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drafters. In essence, judges should avoid contravening the clear
intention of states parties, unduly encroaching on state
sovereignty, and unfairly surprising defendants. The Article
offers a framework for assessing unfair surprise. Subject to these
constraints, judges should interpret the Rome Statute in a
manner that enhances clarity in ICL. Finally, this Article
clarifies the proper role for the Vienna Convention’s “object and
purpose” inquiry. Contrary to the standard meaning given to the
inquiry in ICL, whereby judges justify expansive interpretation
based on the object and purpose of “ending impunity,” this Article
contends that the proper object and purpose of the Rome Statute
is to punish people found guilty of international crimes through a
fair process.
The Article proceeds in four parts. Part I introduces the
Rome Statute’s provision on nullum crimen sine lege, focusing in
particular on its requirements that judges strictly construe crime
definitions, construe ambiguous provisions in favor of
defendants, and avoid crime creation by analogy. It offers
working definitions for relevant concepts and describes some of
the difficulties in applying them, particularly in light of the Rome
Statute’s provision setting out the sources of law the court is to
consider. Part II asks whether strict construction makes sense in
the context of international crimes. It assesses the values that
undergird the principle, most importantly, notice, separation of
powers, the judiciary’s role in protecting individual freedom,
efficiency, and democratic accountability. It concludes that the
justifications relied on in domestic jurisdictions for strict
construction apply more readily in the international context than
one might think, but suffer from many of the same flaws they do
domestically. These flaws are often magnified at the ICC. Part
II also examines justifications for strict construction that are
particular to the ICC, including promoting human rights,
respecting state sovereignty, encouraging participation in the
ICC framework, and ensuring that the ICC focuses its limited
resources on the gravest crimes. Ultimately, this Article finds
merit to these arguments, but not enough to prioritize lenity over
competing language in the Rome Statute itself and over other
tools of interpretation. Part III assesses the potential ordering
for strict construction in light of the purposes it serves. Part IV
then offers a conception of strict construction that distills it to a
few critical principles that better support the justifications for it
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and help to square strict construction with the realities of ICL
and the Rome Statute. These principles are: avoiding usurping
the authority of states, avoiding unfair surprise to defendants,
and seeking, where possible, to clarify ICL. This proposed
conception of strict construction grapples with the inescapable
fact that the great legality challenge of ICL likely is not
ambiguity, but rather vagueness.20
I.

ARTICLE 22(2): STRICT CONSTRUCTION, THE BAR ON
ANALOGY, AND LENITY

Although the existence of international crimes is fairly
uncontroversial, “much of the modern history of ICL has been
consumed by an identity crisis regarding the content and sources
of these offenses.”21 Determining the content of these offenses is
closely tied to legality. ICL is considerably more codified and
clearer now than ever before, and claims of bald after-the-fact
crime creation will likely be less frequent. It seems likely that,
for the ICC, most of the fighting about legality will arise in the
context of strict—or broad—construction of existing crimes.22
This Part introduces the ICC’s provision on strict construction
and attempts to situate it within the legal framework of the ICC.
A.

Article 22(2)

As part of its guarantee of legality, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court includes strict construction, a ban
on analogy, and lenity. In addition to the language on nonretroactivity set out in Article 22(1),23 Article 22(2) provides:
20
This Article uses the dictionary definition of the terms ambiguity and
vagueness. See Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.
com/dictionary/ambiguous (last visited July 22, 2017) (defining the word
“ambiguous” as “capable of being understood in two or more possible senses or
ways”); Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dict
ionary/vague (last visited July 22, 2017) (defining the word “vague” as “not clearly
expressed; stated in indefinite terms; not clearly defined, grasped, or understood; not
thinking or expressing one’s thoughts clearly or precisely”).
21
Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 1073.
22
Cf. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of
Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REV. 189, 195 (1985) (arguing that, due to the codification
and development of American law, true judicial crime creation is a thing of the past
and that the doctrines of strict construction and void for vagueness now do most of
the heavy legality lifting in the United States.).
23
Article 22(1) of the Rome Statute, the non-retroactivity principle, provides: “1.
A person shall not be criminally responsible under this Statute unless the conduct in

2017]

ROME STATUTE STRICT CONSTRUCTION

45

The definition of a crime shall be strictly construed and shall
not be extended by analogy. In case of ambiguity, the definition
shall be interpreted in favour of the person being investigated,
prosecuted or convicted.24

This provision contains three overlapping guarantees in an
attempt to translate strict construction into a variety of legal
languages. First, crime definitions shall be strictly construed.
Second, crime definitions shall not be extended by analogy.
Third, ambiguities shall be interpreted in favor of defendants or
would-be defendants.
In the Anglo-American tradition of criminal law, strict
construction is synonymous with lenity. It is the notion that any
doubt in the meaning of a statutory provision should be resolved
in favor of the defendant.25 In French law, by contrast, strict
construction boils down to teleological inquiry into the intent of
the legislator and a prohibition on defining the crime by
analogy.26 An ICC Trial Chamber in the Prosecutor v. Katanga

question constitutes, at the time it takes place, a crime within the jurisdiction of the
Court.” Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 22(1). Article 22(3) provides: “This article
shall not affect the characterization of any conduct as criminal under international
law independently of this Statute.” Id. at art. 22(3).
24
Id. at art. 22(2).
25
ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 67 (4th ed. 2003);
Zachary Price, The Rule of Lenity as a Rule of Structure, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 885
(2004) (“[T]he ‘rule of lenity’—the common law doctrine, also know as ‘strict
construction,’ that directs courts to construe statutory ambiguities in favor of
criminal defendants”). See generally Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common
Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345. In the United States, courts emphasize that
lenity only applies when a provision is ambiguous, meaning susceptible to more than
one interpretation, not when it is vague, meaning courts must guess as to its
meaning. For vagueness, defendants must argue that the statutory provision is “void
for vagueness.” This Article offers a reading of Article 22’s guarantee of strict
construction that can be used to address both ambiguity and vagueness. See infra
Part IV.
26
The French Penal Code provides that penal law is to be strictly construed.
CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN] [PENAL CODE] art. 111-4 (Fr.) (“La loi pénale est
d'interprétation stricte.”). The requirement entered the code in 1994 and codified a
longstanding principle from French law. XAVIER PIN, DROIT PÉNAL GÉNÉRAL § 50
(6th ed. 2014). Strict construction, according to Xavier Pin, requires precision in
definitions of crimes. The Conseil constitutionel requires that criminal texts be
sufficiently clear and precise that they preclude arbitrariness. Id. § 49. Christophe
André has explained that strict interpretation does not mean narrow interpretation.
Otherwise put, “only the law, but all of the law.” CHRISTOPHE ANDRÉ, DROIT PÉNAL
SPECIAL § 5 (3d ed. 2015) (“[L]a loi, uniquement la loi, mais toute la loi”). Strict
construction also appears to permit interpretation of more than just the statutory
text. To interpret a statute courts will analyze the text but also engage in a
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case likewise equated strict construction with the ban on
analogy, in juxtaposition to Article 22(2)’s requirement that
ambiguity be construed in favor of the defendant, which it put
under the label “in dubio pro reo.”27 In France, the prohibition on
analogy means that judges may not extend a crime by analogy to
a situation that the legislator did not intend but could have
envisioned,28 while in Germany there is no guarantee of strict
construction or lenity.29 German law bars defining crimes by
analogy, meaning crimes are “not [to be] interpreted in a sense
Article 22(2)’s
that goes beyond their literal meaning.”30
redundancies thus theoretically attempt to capture each of these
notions of cabining judges’ ability to create new crimes under the
guise of interpretation. Subtle differences aside, the crux of the
issue in all of these systems is fundamentally the same and boils
down to the vexing question:
What is the line between
interpretation and lawmaking?
Still, these Article 22(2) guarantees are not as firmly
established a set of human rights principles as one might think.
Many states do not recognize the principles and, even where they
do, as in the United States,31 adherence to the principle is
patchy.32 Kenneth Gallant, the author of The Principle of

“teleological” inquiry into the legislature’s intent, including by using legislative
history. PIN, supra, § 50–51.
27
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement
Pursuant to Art. 74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 52–53 (Mar. 7, 2014).
28
PIN, supra note 26, § 52 (“L’analogie qui est strictement prohibé est l’analogie
juridique qui consiste à étendre une incrimination à un cas que le législateur n’a pas
prévu alors qu’il aurait pu le prévoir. Le juge en effet ne doit pas aller au-delà de la
volunté du législateur.”). This aversion to crime creation by analogy also existed in
U.S. law as part of strict construction. See, e.g., United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S.
76, 96 (1820) (“It would be dangerous, indeed, to carry the principle, that a case
which is within the reason or mischief of a statute, is within its provisions, so far as
to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of
kindred character, with those which are enumerated.”).
29
MARKUS D. DUBBER & TATJANA HÖRNLE, CRIMINAL LAW: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH 100 (2014).
30
THOMAS VORMBAUM, A MODERN HISTORY OF GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 42
(Michael Bohlander eds., 2013).
31
See Kahan, supra note 25, at 350–51; Jeffries, supra note 22, at 198–00.
32
See Broomhall, infra note 83, at 960, 962 (noting that “the formulation and
status of the rule [of strict construction] in common law jurisdictions is not free from
uncertainty, and it has been irregularly applied,” and “[l]ike the rule of strict
construction in general, the rule relating to ambiguities is neither uniformly held to
nor clearly defined in national systems”).
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Legality in International and Comparative Criminal Law,
cautions that international human rights law does not require
courts to choose the narrowest possible formulation of crimes.33
Unlike the actual definitions of the crimes in the Rome
Statute, Article 22 apparently was uncontroversial.34
The
ultimate formulation of paragraph 2 stemmed from an American
proposal that replaced a similar Japanese one.35 The Rome
Statute’s legality provision was the product of the positive law
inclinations of many states and states’ desire to understand and
clearly demarcate the risks to states’ own government officials.36
Finally, states wanted to define and understand their own
obligations, since the Rome Statute demands actions from
states.37
A critical ambiguity in Article 22(2) itself is whether the
Article 22(2) guarantees apply only to the provisions of the Rome
Statute setting out the crimes—genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes, and aggression—or whether these
guarantees apply to forms of criminal responsibility as well. This
Article takes the view, shared by others,38 that the forms of
responsibility are part of the definition of the crime, at least for
Article 22(2) purposes.

33
See also GALLANT, supra note 4, at 359 (“In many systems, there is no binding
requirement that the absolutely narrowest definition of crimes set forth in statutes,
codes, or case law be adopted. The current system of international human rights law
does not require this.”).
34
Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, AND
RESULTS 189, 194–95 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
35
Id. at 195. The prior PrepComm formulations did not specifically mention
strict construction or construing ambiguities in favor of defendants. They included
bracketed language providing: “[2. Conduct shall not be construed as criminal and
sanctions shall not be applied under this statute by a process of analogy.]” Language
from PrepComm, Intro and Draft Organization of Work, THE STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 244 (M. Cherif
Bassiouni ed., 1998) [hereinafter PrepComm].
36
LEILA NADYJA SADAT, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE
TRANSFORMATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUSTICE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM 182
(2002) (“[M]any [states] were uncomfortable with a criminal court applying law that
was uncodified.”).
37
Id. at 182.
38
See Sadat & Jolly, supra note 14, at 32–33 (proposing canons of construction
for ICL and applying them to Article 25(3)’s forms of individual criminal
responsibility, in particular the question whether Article 25(3) creates a hierarchy of
responsibility and whether Article 25(3)(a) incorporates the “control of crime” theory
of perpetration); see also Prosecutor v. Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Judgement
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The Drafting of Article 22(2)

The drafters of the Rome Statute sought to accompany the
guarantee of strict construction with a more detailed
international criminal code than seen at prior international
criminal tribunals. Consistent with the commitment to legality
evinced in Article 22, during the negotiations of the Rome
Statute, “[t]here was general agreement that the crimes within
the jurisdiction of the Court should be defined with the clarity,
precision and specificity required for criminal law in accordance
with the principle of legality . . . .”39 However, there was a debate
as to just how much clarity and precision was needed, as well as
whether crimes should be defined explicitly in the statute or
should incorporate by reference other international conventions,40
and whether crime definitions ought to be exhaustive or
illustrative.41 States also disagreed on whether it was necessary
to elaborate on the elements of the crimes in the statute itself.42
Ultimately, the Rome Statute fleshed out the definitions of
crimes more than any prior international criminal instrument.43
The statute “contains not only categories of offences, but also
nearly exhaustively lists more than ninety crimes, which are
supplemented by the Elements of Crimes,” and it sets out
detailed procedural protections and “general principles of
international criminal law,” which include “basic concepts and
modes of individual criminal responsibility, requisite mental

Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute Concurring Opinion of Judge Wyngaert, ¶ 18
n.27 (Dec. 18, 2012).
39
PrepComm, supra note 35, at 394.
40
Id.
41
Id. (“Several delegations expressed a preference for an exhaustive rather then
an illustrative definition of the crimes so as to ensure respect for the principle of
legality,” while others advocated flexibility “to permit the continuing development of
the law.”).
42
Id. (explaining that some states felt it necessary to state the elements either
“in the Statute or in an annex to provide the clarity and precision required for
criminal law, to provide additional guidance to the Prosecution and the Court, to
ensure respect for the rights of the accused and to avoid any political manipulation
of the definitions”).
43
Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 1074–75 (“The statutes of the ICTY
and . . . [ICTR] followed the basic Nuremberg model of listing bare bones offenses,
with many of the core standards of culpability and punishment left unspecified.”).
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elements, grounds for excluding criminal responsibility, and
mistakes of fact and law.”44 It also offers a hierarchy of sources of
law for judges to consult in interpreting the statute.45
These crime definitions, the result of heated, political
wrangling over a relatively short period of time,46 range from
very specific to very vague.47 For example, the Rome Statute
recognizes the war crime of “[e]mploying bullets which expand or
flatten easily in the human body, such as bullets with a hard
envelope which does not entirely cover the core or is pierced with
incisions,” as well as the war crimes of “[c]ommitting outrages
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading
treatment” and “cruel treatment.”48 The first is quite specific.
The latter two are considerably less so.49 In some instances,
crimes were defined more narrowly than under customary
international law. Sometimes, as in the crimes of extermination
and torture, this divergence lowered the requirements of
customary international law.50

44
Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 552–53. Article 9 of the Rome
Statute provides that the Elements of Crimes are to “assist the Court in the
interpretation and application of [the articles defining the crimes]” and shall be
adopted by a two-thirds majority of members of the Assembly of States Parties.
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 9.
45
See Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 553.
46
SADAT, supra note 36, at 261; Shabtai Rosenne, Poor Drafting and Imperfect
Organization: Flaws to Overcome in the Rome Statute, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 164, 167
(2000).
47
See William K. Lietzau, Checks and Balances and Elements of Proof:
Structural Pillars for the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 477,
483–84 (1999) (lamenting the vagueness of the Article 8’s war crime of “[w]ilfully
causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or health” and contending that
“[o]ther examples of ambiguously or poorly defined offenses include ‘wounding
treacherously,’ ‘attacking . . . buildings which are undefended,’ and ‘persecution,’
defined as ‘intentional and severe deprivation of fundamental rights contrary to
international law by reason of the identity of the group or collectivity’ ” and arguing
that “[t]here is a manifest need to clarify the elements of these harms”).
48
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 8(b)(xix), 8(b)(xxi), 8(c)(i).
49
GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN,
COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 85 (2007) (explaining that the Rome Statute
“contains some provisions that would seem to run afoul of the mandate of precision
in legislative definition” including the crimes against humanity of other inhumane
acts and the catch-all provision for sexual violence).
50
Hunt, supra note 17, 66–67 (calling for ICC judges “rapidly to assert their
ability to cure the deficiencies of the Court’s Statute, its Elements of Crimes and its
rules of procedure and evidence which may be impermissibly prejudicial to the
human rights of the accused”).
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Compromise also led to ambiguous definitions of crimes,
sometimes by design.51 Various commentators have referred to
this phenomenon of the drafters’ leaving some language
intentionally ambiguous in order to appease various disagreeing
factions as “constructive ambiguity.”52 As discussed below, the
term “gender” in the Rome Statute is an example of such
constructive ambiguity.53
C.

The Context of Article 22: The Rome Statute’s Hierarchy of
Laws

Much as the Rome statute is far more specific in defining
crimes than the statutes of the ad hoc tribunals,54 particularly
when read in conjunction with the Elements of Crimes, Article 21
suggests that the drafters understood that there were still “areas
for development” through consultation of treaties, principles, and
rules of international law, as well as general principles of law
derived from domestic systems.55
Recognizing its own
incompleteness, the Rome Statute identifies and ranks sources of
law. The Rome Statute’s Article 21(1) states the “Court shall
apply:”
(a) In the first place, this Statute, Elements of Crimes and its
Rules of Procedure and Evidence;
(b) In the second place, where appropriate, applicable treaties
and the principles and rules of international law, including the
established principles of the international law of armed conflict;
(c) Failing that, general principles of law derived by the Court
from national laws of legal systems of the world including, as
appropriate, the national laws of States that would normally
exercise jurisdiction over the crime, provided that those

51
Id. at 67 (lamenting that the need for compromise despite political
disagreement led to “recourse to the extraordinary concept of ‘creative ambiguity’ in
the Statute, so as not to have to deal with an issue upon which agreement would
have proved difficult if not impossible to obtain”); see also Lietzau, supra note 47, at
484.
52
See Hunt, supra note 17, at 67; see also Valerie Oosterveld, The Definition of
“Gender” in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Step Forward or
Back for International Criminal Justice?, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 55, 57 (2005).
53
See discussion infra notes 128–134.
54
Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 552–53.
55
FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 107–08.
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principles are not inconsistent with this Statute and with
international law and internationally recognized norms and
standards.56

Finally, Article 21(3) demands that the “application and
interpretation of law pursuant to this article must be consistent
with internationally recognized human rights” and also be
nondiscriminatory.57
The Rome Statute reigns supreme. The Rome Statute
indicates that, should the statute and Elements of Crimes
conflict in any way, the statute prevails.58 Some commentators
argue that the Elements of Crimes is merely persuasive and thus
does not bind the court.59 Likewise, the court is only to turn to
international law “in the second place” and “where appropriate.”
Judges are to turn to general principles of national law, only
“failing that” and “as appropriate,” as in, absent an answer in the
statute, the Elements of Crimes, and international law.
Judges have interpreted Article 21(2)’s inclusion of general
principles of international law to include customary international
Article 21 does not explicitly mention customary
law.60
international law, which at least one commentator reads to mean

56

Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(1).
Id. at art. 21(3). More precisely, it must “be without any adverse distinction
founded on grounds such as gender as defined in article 7, paragraph 3, age, race,
colour, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, national, ethnic or
social origin, wealth, birth or other status.” Id.
58
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 9(3) and 51(5); see also Dapo Akande,
Sources of International Criminal Law, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE § B, at 47 (Antonio Cassese ed., 2009) (citing
Articles 9(3) and 51(5)); Margaret deGuzman, Article 21, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 704 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2d
ed. 2008) (noting that “[a]n unfortunate inconsistency exists between the language of
article 21 and that of article 9 concerning the role of the Elements of Crimes. Article
21 mandates that the court ‘shall apply’ the Elements of Crimes whereas Article 9
defines the purpose of the Elements as merely to ‘assist the Court in the
interpretation and application of articles 6, 7, and 8,’ ” and proposing to resolve the
conflict “by reading the two provisions together: the Court ‘shall apply’ the Elements
for the purpose of ‘assisting the Court . . . .’ ”).
59
See Jared Wessel, Judicial Policy-Making at the International Criminal
Court: An Institutional Guide to Analyzing International Adjudication, 44 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 377, 413 n.194, 414 (2006) (stating that this view is the majority one)
(citing Valerie Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal Court:
Advancing International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 627 (2004)).
60
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07 Decision on the
Confirmation of Charges, ¶¶ 508–10 (Sept. 30, 2008).
57
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that the states parties intended to eschew such inquiry.61 Most
believe, however, that Article 21(1)(b)’s reference to “principles
and rules of international law” and the “laws or customs of war”
folds in customary international law.62
So far, judges have applied customary international law as
part of international law. For example, the Katanga trial
chamber stated:
Where the founding texts do not specifically resolve a particular
issue, the Chamber must refer to treaty or customary
humanitarian law and the general principles of law. To this
end, the Chamber may, for example, be required to refer to the
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals and other courts on the
matter.63

Thus, judges who confront an ambiguity in ICC law must turn to
international law, including customary international law, to
resolve it. This prompts many important questions: How does a
judge strictly construe a body of law that is based on an
assessment of state practice and opinio juris (a sense of
obligation)?64 What amounts to an ambiguity in customary
international law? One nonconforming state? A majority of
nonconforming states? A lack of clarity over whether conforming
states are guided by opinio juris? Moreover, even if judges can
decipher a customary international law norm, what role is the
norm to play? Does it merely assist judges to interpret the words
of the Rome Statute or must customary international law provide
support for the criminality of the conduct?65

61
FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 222; cf. deGuzman, supra note 58, at 706–07
(canvassing the possible meanings of general principles of international law and
noting that it is unclear whether it meant to include customary international law).
62
See, e.g., deGuzman, supra note 58, at 706–07 (concluding that the drafters
intended some role for customary international law); Wessel, supra note 59, at 415
(arguing the Rome Statute privileges customary international law); Akande, supra
note 58, § D, at 50 (noting that “[a]lthough [it is] listed as a source of applicable law
in Art. 21(1)(b) [of the Rome Statute], custom is likely to play a less prominent role
in that tribunal than in the ad hoc Tribunals” due to the Rome Statute and
Elements of Crimes’ greater specificity on the “elements of each crime, the general
principles of liability, and the applicable grounds for excluding responsibility”).
63
Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, ¶ 47 (emphasis added).
64
See generally ILC CIL 1, supra note 18, ¶ 2.
65
See discussion infra Part IV.B (discussing the risk of unfair surprise to
defendants resulting from potential applications of customary international law to
support criminality).
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Article 21’s final source of law, general principles of domestic
law, likewise complicates the strict construction picture.
Professor Fletcher contends that Article 21(1)(c)’s invocation of
“general principles of law derived from national laws of the legal
systems of the world” renders interpretation of the Rome Statute
a comparative law endeavor.66 Here too, there is the problem of
identifying an ambiguity.
If ambiguity merely means
inconsistent state practice, then ambiguities may be easy to come
by.
In a departure from the practice at the ad hoc tribunals, the
court’s own case law is not binding on judges.67 Article 21(2)
provides: “The Court may apply principles and rules of law as
interpreted in its previous decisions.”68 May, not must. In
addition, the Rome Statute repeatedly flags that ICC decisions
are not to be read to restrict the development of international law
or ICL outside of the ICC.69 However, as Dapo Akande notes,
judicial decisions nevertheless “play a deceptively important role
in international law and ICL.”70 Akande explains that:
In a system where much of the rules are unwritten, judges play
the important role of determining precisely what the law is.
They assess the extent to which state practice and opinio juris
support an alleged rule of customary law. They also decide on
what the general principles of law are.71

Moreover, binding or not, previous decisions give judges in future
cases a default template that is likely to inform their analysis.72
Although the Rome Statute does not explicitly mention the
Vienna Convention and scholars disagree on the appropriateness
of relying on the Vienna Convention in interpreting the Rome
66

FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 222.
This rejection of stare decisis is consistent, however, with the practice of the
International Court of Justice (“ICJ”).
68
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 21(2).
69
Id. at art. 10 (“Nothing in this Part shall be interpreted as limiting or
prejudicing in any way existing or developing rules of international law for purposes
other than this Statute.”); id. at art. 22(3) (“This article shall not affect the
characterization of any conduct as criminal under international law independently
of this Statute.”).
70
Akande, supra note 58, § F, at 53.
71
Id.
72
Id. (“Once those customary rules or general principles are identified through
a process of judicial reasoning, they provide an ‘off the shelf’ assessment of the law
which is often the starting point for deciding future cases. The onus is then on those
who assert that the law is different to provide their own different assessment of the
evidence.”).
67
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Statute,73 the Vienna Convention is yet another source of
guidance to which ICC judges may turn in interpreting crime
definitions. ICC judges already have invoked the principles of
the Vienna Convention in interpreting the Rome Statute,74 in
particular the basic or “general rule”75 of the Vienna Convention.
The general rule provides: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object
and purpose.”76 This rule is part of a framework made up of
“several integrated parts that are collectively designed to
determine the meaning of a treaty provision under
interpretation, and it is generally recognized as reflecting
customary international law.”77 The Vienna Convention permits,
73
See Jacobs, supra note 18, at 30–31 (arguing that judges should not rely on
the Vienna Convention in interpreting the quasi-statutory aspects of the Rome
Statute); Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 557 n.86; Sadat & Jolly, supra
note 14, at 759–61 (noting that, due to the quasi-constitutional and legislative
aspects of parts of the Rome Statute, “traditional interpretative methodologies
(including a straightforward application of the Vienna Convention . . . ) do not fit
neatly with the unique characteristics of the Rome Statute”); deGuzman, supra note
58, at 705 (noting that the “delegates debated whether the VCLT [Vienna
Convention] and the [CAT] [we]re applicable or merely relevant”).
74
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/07, Judgement Pursuant to
Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 43 (Mar. 7, 2014) (“To interpret the relevant provisions of
the Statute and the Elements of Crimes, the Chamber must draw on the method of
interpretation laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘the
Vienna Convention’), specifically articles 31 and 32. The chambers of the Court have
unanimously and systematically based their interpretation of the Statute on the
principles established by the Vienna Convention”) (citing various appeals ICC
chamber and pre-trial Chamber decisions).
75
Id. ¶ 44–45 (noting that the Vienna Convention sets forth “one general rule of
interpretation (“the General Rule”) and one alone . . . . This method of interpretation
prescribes that the various ingredients—the ordinary meaning, the context, and the
object and purpose—be considered together in good faith.”). The General Rule, which
therefore refers to a holistic approach, does not establish any hierarchical or
chronological order in which those various ingredients are to be examined and then
applied.
76
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
77
Anne-Marie Carstens, Interpreting Transplanted Treaty Rules, in
INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 235 (Andrea Bianchi et al. eds. 2015)
(discussing the applicability of the Vienna Convention to international legal norms
transplanted from one legal regime to another). Cf. Duncan Hollis, The Existential
Function of Interpretation in International Law, in INTERPRETATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (Andrea Bianchi et al. eds. 2015) (commenting that “[t]he
treaty’s centrality to existing interpretative inquiries has not, however, translated
into certainty or consensus on treaty interpretation itself. . . . [D]ebate continues
over (i) their legal status, (ii) the interpretative method(s) and techniques they
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among other things, the consultation of travaux préparatoires
(essentially, drafting history for treaties) to do away with
ambiguities in a treaty.78
Perhaps the most controversial issue with international
criminal judges’ reliance on the Vienna Convention is the latter’s
mandate to consider the terms of a treaty in light of the treaty’s
“object and purpose.”79 Several commentators have noted that
this teleological approach arguably conflicts with legality
generally and Article 22(2)’s command of strict construction
specifically.80 As will be discussed below, international courts
have employed the Vienna Convention’s teleological inquiry to
interpret international instruments other than the Rome
Statute, such as international humanitarian law (“IHL”) treaties,
to assist them in interpreting or, sometimes, defining crimes.
What, then, is strict construction in a regime of manifold
sources of law, combined with teleological interpretive techniques
that push for broader interpretation? Before attempting to

privilege, and (iii) the boundaries they set in defining what constitutes
interpretation”).
78
Article 32, on Supplementary Means of Interpretation, provides: “Recourse
may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the
meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning
when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) Leaves the meaning ambiguous
or obscure; or (b) Leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 32, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331;
see also Julian D. Mortenson, The Travaux of Travaux: Is the Vienna Convention
Hostile to Drafting History, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 780, 781 (2013) (arguing that the
drafters of the Vienna Convention “repeatedly reiterated that any serious effort to
understand a treaty should rely on a careful and textually grounded resort to
travaux, without embarrassment or apology”).
79
Robinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 15, at 934; Jacobs, supra note 18, at 33.
80
See, e.g., Akande, supra note 58, § 3(A), at 44 (noting that the Vienna
Convention’s instruction to turn to the travaux préparatoires and object and
purposes “might lead to a temptation to construe ambiguous provisions more
liberally than might appear from simple textual interpretation,” contrary to the in
dubio pro reo or strict construction principle); see also Grover, A Call to Arms, supra
note 14, at 557 (“If legality is recognized as the guiding principle for interpreting
crimes in the Court’s jurisdiction, it would require the textual approach to prevail
over competing intent as well as object and purpose based approaches to applying
Article 31 of the Vienna Convention. This means, quite simply, textual primacy.
Considerations of context, object, and purpose as well as interpretive aids such as
the Elements of Crimes and travaux préparatoires cannot be invoked
inappropriately to broaden, modify, or override the plain meaning of these Articles.
The same is true of normative arguments about the importance of protecting victims
of crimes or giving effect to the Court’s jurisdiction to end impunity.”).
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answer this question, the next Part discusses the justifications
for strict construction and evaluates their applicability to the
world of international criminal justice.
II. PURPOSES OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION
This Part seeks to understand the purpose of Article 22’s
guarantee of strict construction.81 The traditional justifications
for strict construction of criminal statutes are notice and
separation of powers—or legislative supremacy.82 Building on
these traditional grounds, commentators have justified the rule
based on democratic accountability, avoiding arbitrary law
enforcement, efficiency, and eliciting legislative preference. In
the context of the ICC, one may add to this list the goals of
promoting respect for human rights, the rule of law, and the
protection of state sovereignty. This Part evaluates the strength
of these justifications and also flags the drawbacks of too strict a
strict construction regime.
A.

Traditional Justifications for Strict Construction

1.

Notice

One argument in support of strict construction is rooted in a
concern about individual freedom and notice: “[C]itizens have a
right to be warned in advance about the risk that their conduct
will run afoul of the criminal law.”83 As Justice Holmes stated in
McBoyle:
81
Just like the ICC, it turns to domestic scholarship to elucidate this question.
For example, the Lubanga trial chamber has supported inquiry into domestic legal
doctrines to help guide courts to a better informed and reasoned interpretation.
Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 A 5, Judgement on the Appeal of
Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo Against His Conviction, ¶ 470 (Dec. 1, 2014) (“[T]he
Appeals Chamber considers it appropriate to seek guidance from approaches
developed in other jurisdictions in order to reach a coherent and persuasive
interpretation of the Court’s legal texts. This Court is not administrating justice in a
vacuum, but, in applying the law, needs to be aware of and can relate to concepts
and ideas found in domestic jurisdictions.”).
82
FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 81; Price, supra note 25, at 907–12 (debunking
notice and legislative supremacy arguments and arguing that democratic
accountability is a better justification for lenity); Jeffries, supra note 22, at 201–12
(debunking these grounds and the argument based on the “rule of law”).
83
FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 81; see also Bruce Broomhall, Article 22: Nullum
crimen sine lege, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 949, 953 (Otto Triffterer & Kai Ambos eds., 3d ed., 2016) (“As a
principle of interpretation, nullum crimen aims to limit the power of the (unelected)
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Although it is not likely that a criminal will carefully consider
the text of the law before he murders or steals, it is reasonable
that a fair warning should be given to the world in language
that the common world will understand, of what the law intends
to do if a certain line is passed. To make the warning fair, so far
as possible, the line should be clear.84

As Professor Solan notes, “[D]ue process concerns . . . arise when
a court breaks new ground by interpreting a statute or regulation
broadly for the first time in the context of a prosecution.”85 At
least one ICC judge, Christine Van den Wyngaert, has invoked
the notice and rule of law arguments in favor of strict
construction.86
Many question notice as a sufficient justification for strict
construction.87 They acknowledge that the notice argument may
make some sense for regulatory offenses, where someone could
genuinely be caught off guard by a broader interpretation of a

judiciary to interfere with liberty beyond the extent that a reasonable individual
could understand from the words of the relevant prohibition. Just as legal subjects
are presumed capable of knowing and have a duty to obey the law, so too is the
lawmaker responsible for making the law clear and ascertainable, while the
judiciary is obliged in principle to refrain from penalizing conduct not made criminal
by the legislator through the wording of the law in question, and is thus confined to
interpreting and applying, but not making the law.”); Price, supra note 25, at 907
(“The theory here is that narrow construction protects citizens from being caught off
guard by broader prohibitions than they could anticipate”); GROVER, INTERPRETING
CRIMES, supra note 14, at 137.
84
Price, supra note 25, at 907 (quoting McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25,
27 (1931)).
85
Lawrence M. Solan, Statutory Inflation and Institutional Choice, 44 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 2209, 2263 (2003).
86
Prosecutor v. Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Concurring Opinion of Judge
Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 20 (Dec. 18, 2012) (arguing that “[i]ndividuals must have been
in a position to know at the time of engaging in certain conduct that the law
criminalised it” and noting that “[t]he Grand Chamber of the European Court of
Human Rights has given considerable weight to the elements of ‘accessibility’ and
‘foreseeability’ in its assessment of the legality principle”); see also Achour v. France,
2006-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 249, 264 (2006) (“It follows [from Article 7 of the European
Convention on Human Rights] that offences and the relevant penalties must be
clearly defined by law. This requirement is satisfied where the individual can know
from the wording of the relevant provision and, if need be, with the assistance of the
courts' interpretation of it, what acts and omissions will make him criminally
liable”); Kononov v. Latvia, 2010-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 35, 106–07 (2010).
87
The Supreme Court: 2007 Term Leading Cases, 122 HARV. L. REV. 276, 481
n.65 (2008) [hereinafter The Rule of Lenity] (noting that “[s]ome argue that notice is
largely a pretextual justification for the rule of lenity”).
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criminal statute.88
However, for malum in se (innately
immoral)89 offenses, this justification is weak, because it is very
unlikely anyone thinks what they are doing is legal.90
The notice argument seems, at first blush, especially weak in
the context of grave international crimes. After all, most
international crimes are malum in se. As Professor Fletcher has
explained: “The definitions of genocide, war crimes, and crimes
against humanity appeal to shared norms of moral
wrongdoing.”91 Fletcher notes the malum in se nature of the
crimes in turn affects the lack of specificity of the crimes: “The
evils are so obvious that the drafters use catchall provisions that
rely explicitly on moral judgment.”92 Under this view of ICL,
notice may not justify strict construction at the ICC.93
Perhaps the more fundamental critique of the notice
justification is that it relies on the “fiction” that criminals are
reading up on the law.94 Even for regulatory offenses though,
some commentators question the notice justification, given that
the law often seems indifferent to notice, as demonstrated by the
flimsy and formal conception of notice that exists.95 Publication
of a statute is enough. Moreover, the necessary clarity in the
statute need not come from the text of the statute itself; a judicial
decision interpreting it suffices.96 Courts do not require that the

88
However, as Price notes, it could cut the other way, too. Price, supra note 25,
at 908 (“Though it may be true that technical regulatory statutes are less intuitive
than core offenses, they are also one type of criminal law that defendants may
actually read. Certainly participants in regulated industries have only themselves to
blame if they fail to seek counsel’s advice about the potential breadth of
regulations.”).
89
See Malum in se, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
90
Price, supra note 25, at 908 (“[N]otice concerns . . . [do not apply] when crimes
fall deep within . . . societal prohibition”); see also FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 82;
see also Greenawalt, supra note 15, at 1105 (arguing that the fair notice arguments
supporting legality norms apply in less force to international prosecutions for
“manifestly wrongful” conduct).
91
FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 31.
92
Id. (citing the example of “the crime against humanity is based on ‘rape,
sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced sterilization, or any
other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity’ ”).
93
Id. (“In the field of offenses malum in se, lawyers and judges can typically rely
on their moral intuitions to decide what is lawful and what is not.”).
94
Price, supra note 25, at 907.
95
Jeffries, supra note 22, at 207.
96
Id. at 207–08.
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person in fact be on notice of the law, but merely require that the
law exist such that, with a lawyer and some diligence, a person
could have discovered the law.97
The procedures of the ICC seem to affirm this argument that
notice is a low priority at the ICC. Regulation 55, a judge-made
regulation, permits courts to change the legal characterization of
In Katanga, the judges permitted
the charges.98
recharacterization of the charges even after the defendant had
rested his case.99 This civil law style regulation is premised on
the notion that defendants need notice of the factual allegations
against them, but not of the legal characterization of those
facts.100
Still, the argument for notice as a basis for strict
construction at the ICC may be stronger than it first appears.
Arguably, not all crimes in the Rome Statute are malum in se,
but rather malum prohibitum (wrong because it is prohibited)
such as the war crime of transferring the civilian population by
an occupying power101 and various child soldiering offenses.102 As
Fletcher argues, “There may be precise rules governing the
conduct of warfare, but they are not always morally obvious, and
for that reason it is better to think of them as a function of
legislative prohibition, or malum prohibitum.”103 Moreover,

97

Id. at 208.
See generally WAR CRIMES RESEARCH OFFICE, REGULATION 55 AND THE
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Am. Univ. Wash.
Coll. of Law Legal Analysis and Educ. Project ed., 2013); Carsten Stahn,
Modification of the Legal Characterization of Facts in the ICC System: A Portrayal of
Regulation 55, 16 CRIM. L. F. 1 (2005); Sophie Rigney, ‘The Words Don’t Fit You’:
Recharacterisation of the Charges, Trial Fairness, and Katanga, 15 MELB. J. INT’L L.
515 (2014).
99
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Decision on the
Implementation of Regulation 55 of the Regulations of the Court and Severing the
Charges Against the Accused Persons, ¶¶ 17–20 (Nov. 21, 2012).
100
See id.
101
FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 31–32; see also David Luban, Fairness to
Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of International Criminal Law,
in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 585 (Samantha Besson & John
Tasioulas eds., 2010) (arguing that the legality principle is less important in ICL
than in domestic criminal law).
102
See generally MARK A. DRUMBL, REIMAGINING CHILD SOLDIERS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY (2014) (arguing that situation of child soldiers is
more nuanced than ICL would like to portray it to be).
103
FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 31–32; cf. Margaret M. deGuzman, Gravity and
the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 32 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1400,
1405 (2009) (questioning whether all international crimes are grave).
98
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“even as to obviously immoral conduct there might be borderline
cases, and ideally courts should not have the discretion to act
arbitrarily in these cases.”104
Notice may be a more realistic possibility in ICL than in
domestic jurisdictions. In domestic jurisdictions, most would-be
criminals are unlikely to be poring over statutes and court
decisions or have lawyers on retainer to do so for them; whereas,
many, if not most, of the world’s militaries provide training in
IHL, which folds into ICL. Concededly, international criminal
defendants may be civilians or combatants belonging to a rebel
group that does not provide training of this sort, so this
argument may not apply in equal force to all defendants.
2.

Separation of Powers

The other traditional rationale for strict construction is
separation of powers. As Justice Marshall stated in Wiltberger:
“It is the legislature, not the Court, which is to define a crime,
The separation of powers
and ordain its punishment.”105
argument is rooted partly in democratic notions that a legislature
elected by the people should make law and partly in an
assumption of legislative superiority in the area of lawmaking.106
The separation of powers argument is rather weak in the
international context, because there is no international
legislature at the ready to fix mistakes or patch holes in the
law.107 The Assembly of States Parties (“ASP”), a body with one
representative from each state party, is the closest analog to a
legislature the ICC has, but it meets infrequently and is not
charged with legislating.108

104

FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 82.
Price, supra note 25, at 909 (quoting United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. 76,
95 (1820)).
106
Ofer Raban, Is Textualism Required by Constitutional Separation of Powers?,
49 LOY. OF L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5, 19), http://ssrn.com/abs
tract=2735047.
107
Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 137 (“Complicating efforts to create a holistic
corpus of law is the fact that the international system lacks a standing world
legislature that can fill interstices and lacuna, modernize ancient prohibitions, or fix
faulty formulations”); see also Darryl Robinson, International Criminal Law as
Justice, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 699, 706 (2013) [hereinafter Robinson, ICL as
Justice].
108
See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 122.
105
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Also, any assumption that ASP “legislation,” even if it were
to occur, is superior to judicial resolution of an issue is highly
questionable. The negotiations over the definitions of the crimes
in the Rome Statute were difficult and fraught with politics109
and sometimes yielded “lowest common denominator” crime
definitions.110 There is little reason to think that future attempts
at refining the definitions of crimes through agreement of states
parties would be easier or better, even if the occasion presented
itself.
An even bigger strike against the separation of powers
argument is delegation. As one U.S. commentator has argued of
the lenity canon: “[d]elegated criminal lawmaking and [strict
construction] cannot peacefully coexist.”111 Strict construction
only protects legislative supremacy if the legislature did not
intend to delegate lawmaking authority to the courts or, at least,
to permit courts to fill in blanks as they appear in new and
unforeseen factual circumstances.112 The separation of powers
argument is weak where it seems the legislature intended to
delegate lawmaking authority by using broad language.113

109
SADAT, supra note 36, at 261 (arguing that “the codification process was
fated to produce a text that represented a set of political compromises, rather than a
new set of progressive norms criminalizing behavior on a broad scale”); see id. at 266
(“[P]rep comm struggled enormously with the task of defining crimes”) (citing Report
of Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N.
GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. 22, ¶ 57, U.N. Doc A/50/22 (Dec. 12, 1995)). See generally
Cherif Bassiouni, Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 443, 444, n.7 (1999); Rosenne,
supra note 46, at 167–72.
110
SADAT, supra note 36, at 267.
111
Kahan, supra note 25, at 347.
112
Jeffries, supra note 22, at 204 (“[W]here the statute is ambiguous or
inconsistent, separation of powers provides no sure guide. In this frame of reference,
strict construction is required only if the legislature commands that approach. If, as
is usual, the legislature does not speak to that question or specifies a rule of ‘fair
construction,’ interstitial judicial lawmaking is at least tolerated and perhaps
affirmatively authorized. More to the point, it is inevitable. Any resolution of
statutory ambiguity involves judicial choice. The resulting ‘gloss’ on the legislative
text is both politically legitimate and institutionally unavoidable.”); Kahan, supra
note 25, at 347 (arguing that the underenforcement of strict construction, at least in
the context of U.S. federal courts, demonstrates the delegation of criminal
lawmaking power to courts).
113
Solan, supra note 85, at 2261 (arguing that dynamic statutory interpretation
“does not offend . . . fair play” in criminal cases where the statute has broad
language).
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States delegate lawmaking power to international courts in
part for efficiency reasons.114 Discussing judicial lawmaking at
international courts generally, Tom Ginsburg has explained:
“judicial lawmaking serves an interest of the parties in reducing
transaction costs of negotiating the details of a treaty.”115 Often,
“[w]hen states are unsure about the precise type of issue that will
arise, . . . they will implicitly empower the tribunal to resolve
disputes and clarify conventions.”116 At the ICC, the negotiations
were heated and difficult, not to mention, many years in the
making.117 Attempts to amend the statute would likely be
equally so, as suggested by the challenging and ultimately still
incomplete efforts at defining and explaining the court’s
jurisdiction over the crime of aggression.118
States often delegate lawmaking for reasons other than
efficiency. They may “believe that issues of law are best clarified
in the context of actual cases.”119 Indeed, judicial expansion of a
criminal prohibition sometimes may be a good thing: “[I]t is one
114
American scholars have noted the relationship between lenity and efficiency.
Efficiency concerns are sometimes offered as a justification for strict construction.
Kahan, supra note 25, at 349 n.15; see also Isaac Ehrlich & Richard A. Posner, An
Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL STUDS. 257, 262–63 (1974)
(weighing the benefits and transaction costs of up-front identification of the rule
compared to an after-the-fact clarification of the rule by courts).
115
Tom Ginsburg, Bounded Discretion in International Judicial Lawmaking, 45
VA. J. INT'L L. 631, 644 (2005).
116
Id. (“This discussion assumes, however, that the third party acts as an
effective agent of the parties and does not impose its own preferences on them. This
is the familiar problem of principal and agent, and will likely affect the parties’
willingness to designate any third party to resolve disputes. We ought to expect
states party to a treaty to designate third parties to interpret the agreement when
the expected policy losses resulting from the agency problem are outweighed by the
joint benefits to the parties from enhanced coordination.”); see also Allison Marston
Danner, When Courts Make Law: How the International Criminal Tribunals Recast
the Laws of War, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1, 44–46 (2006) (discussing the possibility that
the ICTY was a rogue agent).
117
See generally Rosenne, supra note 46, at 167–72 (criticizing the process of
drafting the Rome Statute and noting problems with the resulting statute).
118
The Rome Statute indicated that the court would have jurisdiction over the
crime of aggression, but put in a placeholder for the crime until states could define
the crime and the nature of the court’s jurisdiction over it. States negotiated a
definition at the Kampala conference, but some very critical questions remain to be
resolved. See generally Beth Van Schaack, The Aggression Amendments: Points of
Consensus and Dissension, 105 PROCEEDINGS OF THE 105TH ANN. MEETING OF THE
SOC’Y INT’L L. 154 (2011).
119
Ginsburg, supra note 115, at 644; see also Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note
14, at 554 (“[S]ome vagueness is inevitable to avoid ‘excessive rigidity and to keep
pace with changing circumstances.’ ”).
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means by which the legal system responds to new ways of
disobeying social norms.”120 States may also delegate to save face
domestically: “[V]agueness may allow treaty parties to claim the
text means different things to their respective domestic
constituencies.”121 They may also do so to hedge their bets on
whether a particular interpretation favors their interests down
the road.122 Thus, “states will sometimes leave details vague, in
which case international adjudicators become delegated
lawmakers.”123
States parties to the Rome Statute clearly intended to
delegate at least some lawmaking power to the court,124
apparently for many of the reasons Ginsburg identifies. Many
provisions are so vague that it seems obvious that the states
parties intended the judges to flesh out the nuances of the rule on
a case-by-case basis.125 The negotiations of the Rome Statute also
reveal that many states parties assumed that the courts would
fill in some blanks in the law.126 Others have noted the desire to
allow the court to address new and varied forms of wrongdoing.127
The concept of gender in the Rome Statute is illustrative.
The word “gender” appears several times throughout the Rome
Statute,128 including in the definition of the crimes against

120
Solan, supra note 85, at 2260–61 (noting federal courts’ rejection of common
law crimes early in American history, but arguing that “there seem to be
circumstances in which the dynamic interpretation of criminal statutes does not
offend the values of legislative primacy or fair play,” most obviously, where “the
legislature uses broad words in the statute”).
121
Ginsburg, supra note 115, at 644.
122
Id. (“Leaving treaties vague may also make sense when parties are unsure
which side of a future dispute they will be on and want to reserve the right to argue
for different positions of law at a later date.”).
123
Id.
124
See Danner, supra note 116, at 48.
125
Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 124–25 (describing ICL’s common-law-style
evolution).
126
Wessel, supra note 59, at 386 (“[S]ome delegates to the ICC’s Preparatory
Commission argued that problems arising from ambiguity in the treaty would be
naturally addressed by the bench.”); see also Lietzau, supra note 47, at 482 (“[M]any
delegations sought open-ended elements in order to expand the discretion of the
Court. These states envisioned a Court that would not only adjudicate criminal
cases, but also could define the law and thus foster its evolution.”).
127
Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 554.
128
Oosterveld, supra note 52, at 57 (noting that the Rome Statute uses the word
gender nine times).
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humanity of persecution.129 Controversially, in the Article on
crimes against humanity, the term “gender” is defined. It is
controversial both in that the drafters defined it, since many
other terms are undefined, and for the definition that the
drafters decided upon.130 Article 7(3) of the Rome Statute
provides:
For the purpose of this Statute, it is understood that the term
‘gender’ refers to the two sexes, male and female, within the
context of society. The term ‘gender’ does not indicate any
meaning different from the above.

Many have criticized the definition for failing to take into
account more modern thinking on gender, captured in a number
of other United Nations documents,131 particularly the notion
that gender is a socially constructed concept and is not
synonymous with sex.132
A leading commentator on ICL and gender, Valerie
Oosterveld contends that the definition of gender in the Rome
The
Statute is an example of “constructive ambiguity.”133
drafters left it intentionally ambiguous, through the apparently
competing language of “male and female” and “within the context
of society,” so that an agreement on the Rome Statute could be
reached between conservative states, particularly the Vatican
and Islamic countries, who would not agree to the more fluid
formulation of gender, and more progressive states. Each side
could claim that its interpretation prevailed.134
A tweak on the separation of powers argument is the notion
of lenity as a tool for eliciting legislative preference.135 This
theory may resonate in the domestic criminal context,
129
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7(1)(h) (“Persecution against any
identifiable group or collectivity on political, racial, national, ethnic, cultural,
religious, gender as defined in paragraph 3, or other grounds that are universally
recognized as impermissible under international law, in connection with any act
referred to in this paragraph or any crime within the jurisdiction of the Court.”).
130
Some commentators have argued that the defining of gender indicated a
desire to cabin or minimize it. Oosterveld, supra note 52, at 57.
131
Id. at 67–71.
132
Id. at 71–79.
133
Id. at 57–58.
134
See also SADAT, supra note 36, at 160 (noting “[t]he beauty, and the
difficulty, of the compromise language employed is that while it was crafted to
appease two irreconcilable points of view, both sides may assert that the definition
as adopted reflects their understanding of the term”).
135
See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM.
L. REV. 2162, 2196–97 (2002).
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particularly in the United States. Since the crime control and
law enforcement lobbies are more powerful than criminals,
alleged criminals, or the criminal defense lobby, strict
construction puts the onus on the side more likely to elicit a
legislative response if the court gets it wrong.136 Justice Scalia
seemed to view strict construction in this way as well. He has
explained that lenity “places the weight of inertia upon the party
that can best induce Congress to speak more clearly and keeps
courts from making criminal law in Congress’s stead.”137
The preference-eliciting argument, if anything, cuts against
strict construction at the ICC. Any legislative response is
unlikely. To amend the Rome Statute or the Elements of Crimes,
a two-thirds vote of the assembly of states parties, which meets
yearly unless by special arrangement, is needed.138 Moreover,
unlike in domestic jurisdictions, it is also not clear whether the
Assembly of States Parties would be more likely to respond to
unduly narrow readings of the law or unduly broad ones. States,
protective of their sovereignty and their own officials, may be
more likely to restrict liability where they view the courts to have
gone too far than to enact more crimes to cover conduct that
judges have excluded from a legal prohibition under the rule of
strict construction.
3.

Limiting Arbitrary Enforcement of Criminal Law

Limiting arbitrariness in the enforcement of the law is
another oft-cited justification for strict construction.139 A robust
lenity doctrine reduces prosecutorial discretion and thus the
possibility for arbitrary enforcement.140 In domestic jurisdictions,
136
See id. at 2166, 2196–06 (discussing lenity as an example of his theory of
preference-eliciting canons of construction).
137
See The Rule of Lenity, supra note 87, at 477 (quoting United States v.
Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008)); see also Elhauge, supra note 135, at 2196.
138
Article 121 on Amendments provides that the Assembly of States Parties
may decide to take up a proposal for an Amendment by a majority vote and may
amend the statute by a two-thirds vote; amendments apply only to states that have
agreed to them. Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 121(5).
139
Cf. Luban, supra note 101, 15–16 (stating that the two main arguments for
the principle of legality are notice and preventing arbitrary enforcement). In her
separate opinion in Ngudolo, Judge Van den Wyngaert made the related argument
that strict construction “is an essential safeguard to ensure both the necessary
predictability and legal certainty that are essential for a system that is based on the
rule of law.” Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Concurring Opinion
of Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 19 (Dec. 18, 2012).
140
Price, supra note 25, at 910–11.
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the chief benefit may be a reduction in arbitrary or even
discriminatory enforcement by police.141 The ICC has no police
force, so this concern about arbitrary police action is absent or at
least greatly reduced.
Despite the lack of a police force, the concern over arbitrary
or politically-driven prosecutions is very much present at the
ICC. One of the United States’ chief reservations about the ICC
is the possibility for politically motivated prosecutions of
American soldiers or officials.142 The withdrawal of African
states from the ICC based in part on the perception that the ICC
prosecutor was discriminating against Africa—all of the ICC’s
cases are against African defendants—confirms that the worry
over selective and arbitrary enforcement is alive.143
This concern about arbitrary enforcement by the ICC
prosecution is overblown, at least on the basis of ambiguities and
vagueness of laws. The Rome Statute, in fact, ties the hands of
the ICC prosecutor far more than domestic jurisdictions do
theirs. The prosecutor must get approval from the Pretrial
Chamber to launch an investigation into a situation, to issue
arrest warrants, and to confirm charges against defendants.144
Moreover, as Luban has explained, “there is simply much less

141
In a variation of this argument, Zachary Price contends that lenity is best
viewed as a means of ensuring transparency and political accountability in the
expansion of criminal law. Lenity, he argues, forces legislators to be more
transparent, makes for more specific and considered rules, and increases the chance
of political resistance to overreaching. Id. at 911; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331,
413–14 (1991) (arguing that lenity “serves the representation-reinforcing goal of
protecting a relatively powerless group (people accused of committing crimes) and
the normativist goal of injecting due process values of notice, fairness, and
proportionality into the political process”). As discussed above, it is far from clear
that ASP negotiations are more transparent than ICC decisions. Moreover, in the
ICC context, unlike in domestic jurisdictions, political resistance to crime expansion
is not in short supply. See discussion supra note 36 and accompanying text. States
have a number of ways of expressing political resistance, including withdrawing
from the court. See Wessel, supra note 59, at 382.
142
John R. Bolton, The Risks and Weaknesses of the International Criminal
Court from America’s Perspective, 41 VA. J. INT’L L. 186, 189 (2000).
143
See Sewell Chan & Marlise Simons, South Africa to Withdraw from
International Criminal Court, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/
2016/10/22/world/africa/south-africa-international-criminal-court.html?_r=0 (noting
the argument of some African leaders that the ICC is “an instrument of modern
colonialism”).
144
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 15(3).
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danger of government abuse in ICL then in domestic legal
systems, because ICL arises from weak, decentralized
institutions rather than strong, concentrated ones.”145
The risk of arbitrary enforcement by judges at the ICC is
likewise low, but not nonexistent. As Jeffries has explained, with
judges, “[t]he risk involved is that judicial particularization of the
broad rubrics of common-law authority will be too ‘subjective,’ too
closely grounded in the facts of the case at hand, insufficiently
abstracted from the personal characteristics of the individual
There is something to this concern in the
defendant.”146
international criminal context.
In attempts to define
international crimes, judges have sometimes blurred the line
between describing the facts of the case at hand and the
definition of the crime.147
Nevertheless, as Jeffries—and Herbert Packer before him—
have argued, the judicial process places checks on judges that
will constrain abuses, in particular “reasoned elaboration.”148
Packer explained that “[t]he fact that courts operate in the open
according to a system of reasoning that is subjected to the
scrutiny of an interested audience, both professional and lay,
militates against any but the most marginal invasions of the
This
values represented by the principle of legality.”149
constraint is very much in operation at the ICC. Far more than
domestic judges, at least at the trial level, ICC judges engage in
lengthy discussion of their legal reasoning in published opinions
that are available on the Internet. In ICL, it is hard to hide the
ball on judicial overreaches.
Jeffries and Packer also note that the common law method of
analogical reasoning, meaning “relat[ing] the particular bad
thing that this man did to other bad things that have been
treated as criminal in the past,” is a substantial impediment to

145

Luban, supra note 101, at 119.
Jeffries, supra note 22, at 214.
147
Caroline Davidson, Explaining Inhumanity: The Use of Crime-Definition
Experts at International Criminal Courts, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 359, 370
(2015) (discussing judges’ reliance on expert witness testimony about forced
marriage and child soldiers at the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the ICC,
respectively, to help define the crimes).
148
Jeffries, supra note 22, at 214.
149
Id. at 215 (quoting HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL SANCTION, 88
(1968)).
146
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arbitrary decision-making.150
If it is taken literally, this
argument is hard to reconcile with Article 22(2)’s bar on defining
crimes by analogy. However, a weaker, and more sensible,
notion of the bar on analogical reasoning—which merely
prohibits judges from reading into a statute conduct that the
legislature contemplated and chose not to include151—would still
allow for analogical reasoning in interpretation of crimes.
B.

Potential Justifications for Strict Construction at the ICC

As the discussion above indicates, some of the justifications
for strict construction that apply in domestic jurisdictions, such
as notice, and avoiding arbitrariness, apply more readily than
one might think at the ICC. Others, such as separation of
powers, eliciting legislative preference, and efficiency are quite
weak. This Part explores additional justifications for strict
construction at the ICC.
1.

Promoting Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and the
Perceived Legitimacy of the ICC

Arguably, the ICC’s need to promote human rights through
exemplary criminal trials justifies a fairly strict version of strict
construction. Many have endorsed the expressive function of
ICL.152 Strict construction is arguably an important piece of this
expressive function—to show the world that even with the worst
of crimes, there must be strict adherence to legality principle.
Larry May, for example, has argued that:
[o]ne of the most important limitations is that we respect the
international rule of law and not merely prosecute on the basis
of our heartfelt moral outrage in the face of mass atrocities . . . .
If we limit our scope, we will have a better chance of defending
international trials for the most egregious of human rights
abuses.153

150
Id. at 214–15 (quoting HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF CRIMINAL
SANCTION, 88 (1968)); see also Cass R. Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106
HARV. L. REV. 741 (1993) (defending analogical reasoning).
151
See discussion supra note 28.
152
MARK DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (2007).
153
LARRY MAY, AGGRESSION AND CRIMES AGAINST THE PEACE 341 (2008)
(advocating a “limited scope for international trials”).
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If judges adhere strictly to the definitions set out in the Rome
Statute and thus do not legislate from the bench, it may also help
to legitimize the court and the court’s decisions in the eyes of
states.154 The ICC, while on firmer footing than it was fifteen
years ago, is not immune to attacks on its legitimacy.155
However, the expressive argument may cancel itself out. An
extremely strict regime of strict construction, whereby little or no
leeway is given to courts for interpretation or application of the
law to new facts, may indeed be the most rigorous version of the
legality principle in the realm of interpretation, but the
expressive costs on other fronts may be quite high. Courts may
be unduly limited in their abilities to express other human rights
values—such as the condemnation of gross human rights or IHL
violations—due to rigid interpretation. As former ICTY Judge
Hunt stated in condemning the positivist trend of the Rome
Statute: “[i]f it is to fulfill its goals efficiently, international
criminal law must be given space to grow, rather than kept in a
straightjacket imposed by a rigid code.”156 This argument is
strengthened by the uncertain status of the Article 22(2)
interpretive rules in international human rights law and
inconsistent state practice.157
Further, if judges are too strict on lenity—the requirement
that ambiguity in crime definitions be construed in the
defendant’s favor—there is a risk of making matters worse from
a legality and transparency perspective. Prosecutors will avoid
arguably ambiguous provisions, which would be interpreted in
the narrowest light possible, in favor of vague ones, rather than
giving the court the opportunity to clarify the more specific but
154
See Robert Cryer, The Ad Hoc Tribunals and the Law of Command
Responsibility, in JUDICIAL CREATIVITY AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
TRIBUNALS 163 (Shane Darcy & Joseph Powderly eds., 2010) (“[T]he judges of the
ICTY know very well that their ability to affect the law is related to the extent to
which they can convince states that their interpretation of the law is acceptable.”).
Lietzau, supra note 47, at 482 (decrying the preference of “many delegations [to the
negotiations of the Rome Statute]” for “open-ended elements in order to expand the
discretion of the Court” to “define the law and thus foster its evolution,” and arguing
that “judicial activism of this nature conflicts with the most fundamental principles
of criminal law”).
155
MAY, supra note 153, at 335 (“In my view, the International Criminal Court
needs to gain widespread acceptance, especially in non-Western countries, to best
thwart the specter of political leaders in the dock continuously indicting the ICC
itself instead of being forced to respond to the evidence of their putative misdeeds.”).
156
Hunt, supra note 17, at 59.
157
See discussion supra notes 32 and 33.
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ambiguous law. This shift in charging practice may stymie the
development of ICL and lead to retrograde definitions of crimes
on issues where attitudes are shifting or have shifted since the
drafting of the Rome Statute.
2.

Protecting State Sovereignty

At the ICC, strict construction may be better understood as a
doctrine that protects state sovereignty than as a human rights
principle that protects individual defendants. Bill Schabas has
argued that “[t]he drafters at Rome will justify the provision by
invoking the nullum crimen rule and human rights norms, but
the underlying reason may be far less noble, a technique to
stymie dynamism in the future Court.”158 The Rome Statute’s
crime definitions demarcate where states were willing to give up
sovereignty, at least if they fail to investigate and prosecute
offenses, and where they were not.159
Although less noble than justifying strict construction based
on human rights principles, the sovereignty justification for strict
construction warrants attention for instrumental reasons. The
ICC may gain legitimacy in the eyes of states by respecting the
This restraint may encourage
bounds of state consent.160
participation of states, like the United States, concerned about
their citizens appearing before the court for ever more broadlydefined crimes.161 It also may keep the court from losing the
support or even membership of countries that signed on initially,

158
Schabas, supra note 10, at 886–87 (“Indeed, we may well ask if the elaborate
subject-matter jurisdiction provisions in the Rome Statute, not to mention that
obsessive exercise in legal positivism known as the Elements of Crimes, as well as
the entrenchment of the ‘strict construction’ principle in article 22(1) [sic], were
reactions to the innovations of Judge Cassese and his colleagues in the
interpretation of the ad hoc Tribunals Statutes.”).
159
SADAT, supra note 36, at 182 (noting that in negotiations of the Rome
Statute, the specter of cases against states’ own government officials loomed large,
so states had an incentive to define crimes clearly so that states could understand
the extent of the court’s jurisdiction); see also Broomhall, supra note 83, at 951;
Schabas, supra note 10, at 886.
160
Wessel, supra note 59, at 401.
161
Ambiguity is one of the reasons the United States opposes the court. Id. at
400 (citing President William J. Clinton, Statement on Signature of the
International Criminal Court Treaty (Dec. 31, 2000), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pk
g/WCPD-2001-01-08/pdf/WCPD-2001-01-08-Pg4.pdf) (noting that “U.S. civilian and
military negotiators helped to ensure greater precision in the definitions of crimes”);
see also Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 189, n.378 (noting that the vagueness of
definitions one of U.S.’s chief concerns in not signing the Rome Statute).
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but disagree with expansive interpretations of crimes. As Wessel
has noted of international courts generally, there is a “strategic
interplay created by the tension between the legitimacy
international courts gain from deferring to state consent and the
‘normative
bias
favoring
international
completeness,
predictability, coherence, and dynamism.’ ”162
Even where states may not have intended to give up
sovereignty, ICL is premised on the notion that some crimes are
grave enough to warrant bending traditional notions of
sovereignty.163 Even though the ICC’s jurisdiction is not based on
universal jurisdiction, unless the case comes to the court through
a Security Counsel referral, it still exclusively, or almost
exclusively,164 adjudicates universal jurisdiction crimes. Thus,
too high a prioritization of sovereignty may be misplaced.
3.

Bolstering the Gravity Requirement

Arguably, lenity and strict construction can be justified as
supporting the ICC’s gravity requirement. As a matter of
prosecutorial discretion and jurisdiction, the Rome Statute
requires that the crimes before the court be of sufficient
Many crimes also contain independent gravity
gravity.165
requirements.166
For example, the war crimes provision
encompasses only “grave” breaches of the Geneva Conventions or
other “serious violations of the laws [of war.]”167

162
Wessel, supra note 59, at 382 (quoting Richard H. Steinberg, Judicial
Lawmaking at the WTO: Discursive, Constitutional, and Political Constraints, 98
AM. J. INT’L L. 247, 258 (2004)).
163
The topic of sovereignty and international law is the subject of a great deal of
international law and international relations scholarship. This Article does not
attempt to canvass this vast literature, but merely seeks to flag the relationship
between concerns about sovereignty and strict construction.
164
Genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes are typically considered
universal jurisdiction crimes. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
§ 404 (1987); see also Michael P. Scharf, Universal Jurisdiction and the Crime of
Aggression, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357, 381, 389 (2012) (evaluating whether aggression
is also a crime of universal jurisdiction and concluding that it arguably is, though
domestic prosecutions for aggression may be problematic).
165
See deGuzman, supra note 103, at 1405 (“[T]he concept of gravity provides a
legal and normative basis for the Court's jurisdiction as well as the exercise of that
jurisdiction; and second, consideration of relative gravity is an important factor in
the Prosecutor's discretionary selection of situations and cases to pursue”).
166
See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 6–8.
167
Rome Statute, supra note 1, arts. 8(2)(a), 8(2)(c), 8(2)(e).
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Strict construction may support the gravity requirement by
way of statutory interpretation. In many instances, the broad
interpretation of a provision is also the extension of a crime
definition to a slightly less grave context. For example, in
Lubanga the parties fought over whether the crime of “using”
children “to participate actively in hostilities” included children
in support roles, such as porters and lookouts. Using children in
support roles, though harmful and reprehensible, arguably is not
as bad as using them directly as fighters.168 To the extent that it
is equally bad, due to rampant sexual abuse of the children, for
example, it arguably constitutes any number of other
international crimes.169 Strict construction would encourage the
prosecution to select the more appropriate and, arguably, graver
charges up front. Charging the defendant with the optimal
charge may not always be easy given the difficulties prosecutors
face collecting evidence in hostile areas and even zones of
ongoing conflict, but it should be encouraged.
This gravity-enforcing notion of strict construction may put
ICL on more solid footing from a philosophical perspective. The
graver the crimes, the more justified the encroachment on state
sovereignty.170 The chief problem with this notion of strict
construction as a means of bolstering the Rome Statute’s
requirement is that it is an imperfect tool for guaranteeing
gravity. For one, the prosecution may avoid the command of
construing ambiguous crime definitions in favor of the defendant
by picking a vague one instead. Moreover, it may not always be
the case that the broad interpretation of a crime extends its
reach to less grave conduct. To use again the Lubanga “use” of
child soldiers example, arguably, a better understanding of
children in armed conflict leads to the conclusion that front line
168
But see Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1229-AnxA,
Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Annex A: Written Submissions of the
United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Children and
Armed Conflict Submitted in Application of Rule 103 of the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence (Jan. 29, 2007) (explaining that, when one better understands the realities
on the ground, it becomes clear that using children in support roles is just as grave
and should punished as harshly as using children as fighters).
169
One problem in Lubanga was that the prosecutor did not charge sexual
violence crimes in the first place. See Susanna Greijer, Thematic Prosecutions of
Crimes Against Children, in THEMATIC PROSECUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL SEX
CRIMES 137, 151 (Morten Bergsmo ed., 2012).
170
See generally MAY, supra note 153, at 338 (arguing for “moral minimalism”
in ICL).
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and support roles are equally harmful, and liberal interpretation
of the crime merely includes equally grave conduct within the
reach of the criminal sanction.171
III. TIMING IS EVERYTHING—OR IS IT?
If Article 22(2) is read in a way that reduces it to the
guarantee that ambiguity in crime definitions be construed in
favor of the defendant, which is the common law lenity canon,
then timing is everything. Does it come into play as soon as
judges find an ambiguity in the text of the Rome Statute, or only
after they consult other sources of law or exhaust other tools of
interpretation before finding an ambiguity?172 As American
scholars Price and Kahan have noted, “if lenity invariably comes
in ‘last,’ it should essentially come in never.”173 Commentators
have noted the same dynamic in ICL: “[a]pplying, at a prior
stage, a teleological approach that maximizes victim protection
means that there is never an ambiguity left for strict
construction to resolve, because all ambiguities have already
been resolved against the accused.”174

171
The expert on child soldiers and ultimately the court in Lubanga emphasized
that the use of child soldiers in support roles was as grave as their use in combat.
See Davidson, supra note 147, at 398–00.
172
Cf. Price, supra note 25, at 890 (“The key question in applying lenity,
therefore, is what rank the rule holds relative to other interpretive conventions. If
multiple interpretive resources—say, plain text and legislative history—were given
equal rank to each other and to lenity, then the rule of lenity would have significant
implications. In that case, if the text supported a broad view and the legislative
history a narrower one, lenity would compel adoption of the latter. On the other
hand, if other conventions came before lenity, they would often resolve ambiguities
before lenity took effect.”); Kahan, supra note 25, at 384–85 (“The ‘meaning’ of a
statute is a function not just of the signification of words to English-speaking people
generally but of the interpretive conventions shared by members of the legal culture
in particular. Statutory language is ‘ambiguous’ when these conventions conflict or
point in different directions. Ambiguity is either avoided or resolved by giving
certain of these conventions priority over others.”).
173
Price, supra note 25, at 890 (quoting Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal
Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 384–85).
174
See Robinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 15, at 934; Perrin, supra note 15, at
377 (“Due to the relative exhaustiveness of international interpretive doctrines, the
maxim [in dubio pro reo] which is a fundamental interpretive principle in many
national systems was essentially eviscerated, demonstrating the repercussions of
relying on public international law interpretive canons to resolve international
criminal law issues.”).
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If, however, the guarantee of strict construction and the ban
on analogy have meaning independent of lenity, timing may be
less critical. Even where lenity is effectively read out of the
statute through interpretive techniques, the guarantee of strict
construction and the ban on analogy may help to cabin judicial
overreaching.
Commentators on strict construction in ICL have largely
fallen into one of two camps. One camp puts lenity last and
endorses the framework set out by the European Court of Human
Rights (“ECtHR”).
This ECtHR framework views strict
construction as a rather flexible notion that boils down to
whether the broad interpretation or judicial “adaptation” of a
crime was foreseeable and consistent with the essence of the
offense.175 The other camp embraces a positive law approach to
ICL interpretation and advocates a more robust version of strict
construction wherein ambiguity is recognized sooner, without
resort to nebulous principles of international and domestic
criminal law or the tools of interpretation of the Vienna
Convention, and is resolved in favor of the accused.176 This Part
critiques the arguments of both camps and offers a more nuanced
look at the potential ordering and meanings of lenity.
This Part concludes that a natural and logical reading of
Article 21 indeed puts the Article 22(2) guarantee of lenity last,
which means that it is unlikely to play much of a role in
interpreting the Rome Statute. Part IV explains why putting
175
Shahabuddeen, supra note 10; CASSESE, supra note 7; Sadat, supra note 14,
at 763; Van Schaack, supra note 2. Although Leena Grover also set out this
argument in her article on interpreting the Rome Statute, it was unclear whether
she endorsed it. Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 554. Her book on the Rome
Statute makes clear that she believes the ECtHR formula’s notion that “the ‘essence’
of the offence . . . is perhaps too malleable for criminal law and therefore at risk of
being abused,” and potentially conflicts with the ban on extending crimes by
analogy. GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES, supra note 14, at 173–74.
176
See Jacobs, supra note 18, at 23. Jacobs argues for the most rigorous positive
law regime, but others are sympathetic to the problem of broad construction of ICL
in the name of the object and purpose of fighting impunity; see also Sluiter, supra
note 15, at 257 (decrying tribunal’s tendency to invoke “fighting impunity” as
something like a canon of statutory construction to the detriment of the rule of
lenity). Robinson started the conversation by noting the illiberal tendencies of ICL to
construe crimes expansively, at the expense of the legality principle, in order to fight
impunity, but in more recent scholarship seems not to embrace a strict version of
lenity. Compare Robinson, Identity Crisis, supra note 15, with Robinson, ICL as
Justice, supra note 107, at 700–01 (arguing that the most lenient interpretation of
the law is not necessarily the best and noting the concern that the ICC become an
“expensive acquittal machine”).
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lenity last does not render Article 22(2) meaningless. Giving
independent meaning to strict construction and the bar on
analogy may help to curtail overly aggressive judicial extensions
of the law not only where the law is ambiguous, as in, having
more than one meaning but also, importantly, where it is vague,
as in, leaving one to guess at its meaning.177
A.

Lenity First: Textual Ambiguity in Rome Statute—or Rome
Documents—Alone then Lenity?

If legality were prioritized above all else, Article 22(2)
arguably would demand that any ambiguity on the face of the
Rome Statute, or less restrictively, on the face of the Rome
Statute and other ICC documents, such as the Elements of
Crimes, should be resolved in favor of the defendant.178 This
approach seems to ensure strict fidelity to the legality principle,
since it excludes judicial recourse to uncodified principles of
international law and general principles of domestic law to
eliminate ambiguities. Reliance on these sources, which are at
best not codified by the ICC, and at worst not codified anywhere,
seems to be the most problematic aspect of Article 21 from a
legality perspective. However, these legality gains come at too
high a cost.
Professor Dov Jacobs supports a positivist conception of ICL
and a stricter adherence to the legality principle in interpreting
the crimes of the Rome Statute that would support this ordering
of lenity—or perhaps the next one, which also permits
consultation of the Elements of Crimes and Rules of Procedure
and Evidence (“RPE”).179 Using what he calls a “functional
approach”—under the “quantum theory of positivism”—to
interpret the Rome Statute, he advocates interpreting the Rome
Statute differently depending on the institutional context in
which a provision is used180:
177

See supra note 20.
Grover likewise seems to suggest that if the court adheres strictly to the
principle of legality, this is what strict construction means. Grover, A Call to Arms,
supra note 14, at 557 (“If legality is recognized as the guiding principle for
interpreting crimes in the Court’s jurisdiction, it would require the textual approach
to prevail over competing intent as well as object and purpose based approaches to
applying Article 31 of the Vienna Convention.”).
179
Jacobs, supra note 18, at 2.
180
Id. at 3–4. Professor Sadat appears to agree with reading the Rome Statute
differently depending on the subject matter of the particular provision. Leila Nadya
178
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[W]hen a Judge applies the ICC Statute in criminal
proceedings, for example, he is applying it qua treaty, but
applying it as the internal instrument for the functioning of the
Court, which therefore does not automatically warrant, as
usually claimed, the reference to the Vienna Convention as
providing the rules of interpretation.181

In sum, this means keeping Vienna out of Rome, at least when
interpreting the ICC’s provisions dealing with crimes, and giving
strict construction some teeth.182
Given that the Rome Statute includes significant detail on
many crimes and a section on general principles and defenses,
this approach is more possible at the ICC than it would have
been at previous international tribunals.183 It also squares with
the plain text of Article 22(2), as well as the states parties’
apparent desire to avoid the freewheeling judicial lawmaking of
the ad hoc tribunals and the Rome Statute’s purported
commitment to making the ICC a model human rights
institution.
However, this approach to reading the Rome Statute is hard
to reconcile with textualism, which, after all, looks at the text of
a statute in the context of other provisions of the statute, since it
would make other provisions of the Rome Statute nonsensical.
Why enumerate sources of law in Article 21 if judges are only
permitted to base their interpretation of the statute on the
statute itself? It likewise appears to contravene Article 9, which
provides that the “[e]lements of Crimes shall assist the Court in
the interpretation and application of articles 6 [genocide], 7
[crimes against humanity] and 8 [war crimes].”184 Finally, some
of the crime definitions in fact incorporate by reference other
Sadat, Legacy of the ICTY: The International Criminal Court, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV.
1073, 1078 (2003) (“[T]eleological methods should be applied to constitutive aspects
and provisions representing foundational principles of the Rome Statute, while
canons of strict construction are the appropriate guide to interpreting the ‘legislation
within the Statute,’—that is, the definitions of crimes, which should be narrowly
interpreted in accordance with the legality principle and article 22(2)’s command
that definitions of crimes shall be strictly construed and not extended by analogy.”).
181
Jacobs, supra note 18, at 38 (arguing that the institutional context in which
the document will be applied is more important than the manner in which it was
created).
182
Like Judge Van den Wyngaert, he appears to believe that strict construction
applies not only to the articles defining the substantive crimes, but also to the
provisions dealing with forms of liability. Jacobs, supra note 18, at 15–16.
183
See discussion infra note 43.
184
Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 9.
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fields of international law, so, at least for those provisions, a
strict “Rome Statute only” approach to lenity contravenes the
intent of states parties.185
Further, the costs of this strict version of strict construction
may simply be too high in relation to the relatively modest
benefits. Although the ICC should be a model human rightsrespecting criminal institution, it is not clear that it needs to be
the world’s leader on lenity, which, after all, appears not to rise
to the level of a human right recognized by customary
international law.186 Where lenity exists chiefly to protect state
sovereignty, not defendants’ rights, we may not wish to prioritize
it so starkly over other legitimate goals, including human rights
enforcement.187
This very strict version of lenity seems a prime example of
the “danger [of courts] over-correct[ing]” in response to the liberal
critique of ICL.188 As Professor Darryl Robinson has noted,
whereas the ad hoc tribunals were accused of being “conviction
machines,” the ICC “is much more likely to be accused of being a
very expensive ‘acquittal machine.’ ”189
This lenity-first approach also may prove unworkable despite
the relatively detailed definitions set out in the Rome Statute.
As Jolly and Sadat have noted, strict textualism is harder in ICL
than in domestic jurisdictions. The textualist penchant for
pulling out the dictionary gets rather difficult with a treaty with
official translations in six different languages.190 A resort to
plain language is likely to lead to a great deal of ambiguity, and a

185
See, e.g., id. at art. 8(2) (“For the purpose of this Statute, war crimes means:
(a) Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, namely, any of the
following acts against persons or property protected under the provisions of the
relevant Geneva Convention: . . . (b) Other serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in international armed conflict, within the established framework of
international law . . . .”) (emphasis added).
186
Id. at art. 8(2)(a).
187
GALLANT, supra note 4, at 359.
188
See Robinson, ICL as Justice, supra note 107, at 700.
189
See id.
190
Sadat, supra note 14, at 765 (“While resort to the dictionary is sometimes
useful, and was a technique employed by the judges in Lubanga regarding the
meaning of ‘enlistment’ and ‘conscription’, this is a methodology to be sparingly
employed given that a text like the Rome Statute is ‘authentic’ or official in six
languages and is a highly complex instrument with ancillary texts like the Rules of
Procedure and Evidence and Elements of Crimes that complete its meaning.”).
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bloated role for the lenity canon, particularly when compared to
domestic jurisdictions, which, if they recognize it at all, invoke it
inconsistently.191
Importantly, this lenity-first approach to Article 22(2) may
make for unnecessary divergences between ICL and IHL, and to
the detriment of both bodies of law. The Rome Statute would be
interpreted in a vacuum with no regard to IHL, international law
generally, or general principles of criminal law other than those
explicitly provided for in the statute. This may make for a rather
ill-informed ICL, which is unfair to defendants, particularly
military commanders who are likely to rely on military training
in IHL.
Putting lenity first also may undermine enforcement of
IHL.192 The outcry over the ICTY trial chamber’s decision on
targeting in the Gotovina decision seems to be an apt example of
problematic ICL interpretation with insufficient regard to
established principles of IHL.193 In Gotovina, “the Trial Chamber
found that all impact sites located more than 200 metres from a
target it deemed legitimate served as evidence of an unlawful
artillery attack.”194 Commentators complained that the trial
chamber’s overly strict test had no basis in IHL and would lead

191

See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
The International Committee of the Red Cross, for example, has supported
criminal sanctions for violations of IHL in order to increase deterrence. It believes
that, due to the criminalization of IHL norms, “states will make a greater effort to
teach and integrate the law effectively within state institutions and civil society, and
will prosecute and punish the perpetrators of any IHL violations.” Patrick Zahnd,
How the International Criminal Court Should Help Implement International
Humanitarian Law, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES, PEACE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THE
ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 43 (Dinah Shelton ed., 2000) (noting
that the threat of the ICC stepping in if a state fails to investigate or punish is
additional motivation).
193
See, e.g., Laurie R. Blank, Operational Law Experts Roundtable on the
Gotovina Judgment: Military Operations, Battlefield Reality and the Judgment’s
Impact on Effective Implementation and Enforcement of International Humanitarian
Law, in EMORY PUB. L. & LEG. THEORY RES. PAPER SERIES, No. 12-186, 2 (Jan. 28,
2012), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1994414; see also Gary Solis, The Gotovina
Acquittal: A Sound Appellate Course Correction, 215 MIL. L. REV. 78, 82 (2013) (“The
Gotovina-Markac trial judgment rested heavily on a flawed standard of artillery
accuracy, which the AC [Appeals Chamber] unanimously found to have no support
in either the record of trial or the real world of armed conflict.”).
194
Prosecutor v. Gotovina, Case No. IT-06-90-A, Judgement, 25–67 (Nov. 16,
2012) (discussing and rejecting the Trial Chamber’s 200 meter standard).
192
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military commanders to disregard the teachings of ICL or find
ways around the test that would wind up incurring more civilian
casualties.195
Interpreted in the strictest, Rome Statute only sense, the
lenity-first version of Article 22(2) likewise upends a great deal of
work, including in the elaboration of the Elements of Crimes. As
Leena Grover has noted, the Elements of Crimes document is a
helpful interpretive tool that serves as a “ ‘decoder’ of archaic
language in the Rome Statute,” and also fills in details where the
provisions of the Rome Statute are vague or ambiguous.196 The
legality gain of permitting judges to analyze the text of only the
Rome Statute, rather than the Rome Statute and the Elements of
Crimes, before turning to lenity, seems minimal. Although the
Elements of Crimes was negotiated after the Rome Statute, the
states parties agreed to its creation in the Rome Statute, it was
the product of negotiations among states parties, and it too only
applies to defendants prosecuted after its creation.197
B.

Ambiguity After All of Article 21 Sources then Lenity?

An alternative Article 21 focused ordering would permit
judges to interpret the Rome Statute using all of the sources set
out in Article 21 to guide them before turning to the lenity canon.
Judges therefore could draw on the Elements of Crimes and, if
relevant, RPE, as well as general principles of international law
or those derived from national systems, to help them resolve
ambiguities in ICC law. This version of lenity represents a less
rigorous legality regime. It deemphasizes the lenity canon
because judges have more tools of interpretation at their disposal
before finding an ambiguity. However, this ordering is a more
sensible reading of Article 22 in light of Article 21 than the
others above. Why permit the judges to consult those other
sources of law, if not to help them to interpret and produce more
refined definitions of the crimes?
One difficulty with this approach is identifying just what
strict construction, analogizing, or ambiguity means in a world of
many possibly contradictory and unwritten sources of law.
195

Blank, supra note 193, at 3–7.
Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 576.
197
The Elements of Crimes was completed on June 30, 2000. See Philippe
Kirsch & Valerie Oosterveld, The Preparatory Commission for the International
Criminal Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 563, 564 (2001).
196
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Judges have shown themselves to be rather keen to declare that
customary international law has an answer to questions based on
dubious evidence to avoid a finding of an ambiguity.198 The same
difficulty presents itself with putting lenity “dead last.”199
C.

Dead Last—All of Article 21 Plus Canons of Construction,
Including the Vienna Convention then Lenity?

The approach described above gives a greater role to lenity
than the dead last approach, which puts the lenity canon after all
of the Article 21 sources and cannons of interpretation, including
the tools of the Vienna Convention. This dead last approach
prevailed at the ICTY200 and appears to be the dominant
approach at the ICC.201

198
See generally Joseph Powderly, Distinguishing Creativity from Activism:
International Criminal Law and the ‘Legitimacy’ of Judicial Development of the Law,
in ASHGATE RESEARCH COMPANION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW (2013).
199
Cf. Price, supra note 25, at 891 (2004) (using the term “dead last” to describe
invocation of the lenity canon only after exhausting all other tools of statutory
interpretation).
200
This dead last vision of strict construction was the prevailing one at the
ICTY. See Prosecutor v. Hadz̆ihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Separate and
Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hunt: Command Responsibility Appeal, (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 16, 2003); see also Prosecutor v. Delalic,
Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, ¶ 413 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia
Nov. 16, 1998) (stating that “[t]he effect of strict construction of the provisions of a
criminal statute is that where an equivocal word or ambiguous sentence leaves a
reasonable doubt of its meaning which the canons of construction fail to solve, the
benefit of the doubt should be given to the subject and against the legislature which
has failed to explain itself” but nevertheless choosing the broad construction)
(emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-99-37-AR72, Decision on
Dragoljub Ojdanic’s Motion Challenging Jurisdiction—Joint Criminal Enterprise,
¶ 27 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 21, 2003) (noting the
defendant’s argument that “in case of doubt as to the content or meaning of a rule,
the interpretation most favourable to the accused should be adopted” but finding no
ambiguity in the statute after consulting the language of the ICTY Statute,
Nuremberg and ICTY caselaw, the objects and purposes of the statute, and
legislative history); Prosecutor v. Hadz̆ihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Decision
on Interlocutory Appeal Challenging Jurisdiction in Relation to Command
Responsibility, ¶ 12 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 16, 2003) (July
16, 2003) (stating, in response to the defendant’s argument that “[u]ncertainty in the
law must be interpreted in favour of the accused,” that, “As I understand the
injunctions of the maxim in dubio pro reo and of the associated principle of strict
construction in criminal proceedings, those injunctions operate on the result
produced by a particular method of interpretation but do not necessarily control the
selection of the method”).
201
See discussion infra note 205. Some commentators take it as a given that
strict construction comes last. See, e.g., Broomhall, supra note 83, at 961 (“[L]ike the
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In Katanga, the court made it clear that, in its view, strict
construction was the absolute last resort.202 It acknowledged that
under Article 22, the court may not define new crimes by analogy
or extend the crimes to situations the drafters of the Rome
Statute did not intend.203 Espousing a positivist, jura novit curiastyle vision of the law, it noted: “The primary task of the bench
in criminal cases is the application and interpretation of the law
but, under no circumstances, creation of the law, since the sole
purpose of the bench’s interpretative activity is to impart
meaning to existing law.”204 This seems like a reasonably strict
version of strict construction. However, the court immediately
cabined this language, stating that Article 22(2)’s guarantee of
strict construction, or as it called it:
in dubio pro reo . . . is applicable only ‘in case of ambiguity’ and
clearly should be relied on only after an unsuccessful attempt at
interpretation effected in good faith and in accordance with the
General Rule of the Vienna Convention or in accordance with
article 32 of the Convention.205

The most problematic aspect of relying on the Vienna
Convention is its acceptance of teleological interpretation, or at
least the version of it many judges have deployed to justify
expansive readings of crimes. As noted above, international
judges’ reliance on the object and purpose analysis to justify
expansive interpretation is controversial. Part IV.A.2 proposes a
way to cabin the dangers of teleological interpretation.
D. Backstop Rule of Foreseeability and Consistency with the
“Essence” of the Offense
Many ICL commentators argue that strict legality is neither
feasible nor desirable for ICL, which in turn permits a less strict
notion of strict construction.206 According to this view, what is

rule of strict construction, analogy is an interpretative technique used as the last in
a series of steps.”).
202
Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgement Pursuant to
Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 50–57 (Mar. 7, 2014).
203
Id. ¶ 52.
204
Id.
205
Id. ¶ 53.
206
Sadat, supra note 14, at 763 (“[I]t is not possible (or appropriate) to ‘elevate
strict construction over every other goal of the ICC Statute, including substantive
justice’ ”); see also Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 178–80; Luban, supra note 101, at
581.
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required by the principle of legality is that a judicial
interpretation is “reasonably foreseeable” and consistent with the
“essence” of an offence.207 This formulation seems to depend less
on the ordering of the lenity canon for its weakness, since it
appears to presume that lenity—construing ambiguities in favor
of defendants—rarely comes into play due to the many
interpretive techniques at a judge’s disposal. This Part assesses
this formula and concludes that, though it is commendable for
trying to strike a balance between reality and theory, it
ultimately requires refinement.
Two particular cases in which the European Court of Human
Rights heard claims relating to the United Kingdom’s
elimination of its marital defense to rape figure prominently in
this notion of strict construction.208 In these cases, the ECtHR
held that the UK’s judicial elimination of the marriage defense to
rape did not violate nullum crimen sine lege.209 The court
explained that nullum crimen sine lege “cannot be read as
outlawing the gradual clarification of the rules of criminal
liability through judicial interpretation from case to case,
provided that the resultant development is consistent with the
essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen.”210 So, the

207
Sadat, supra note 14, at 763 (quoting SW v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct.
H.R. (ser. A) 363, ¶ 36, 49 (1995)); see also Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Policy-Oriented
Law in the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, in MAN’S
INHUMANITY TO MAN: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOUR OF ANTONIO
CASSESE 889 (2003) (defending a policy-oriented approach and advocating the same
formula).
208
SW v. United Kingdom, 21 Eur. Ct. H.R. 363, (ser. A) ¶ 36, 49 (1995); C.R. v.
the United Kingdom, 1995 Eur. Ct. H.R. 51, ¶ 42 (1995).
209
Van Schaack also embraces the ECtHR foreseeability formula in her
discussion of the broader concept of nullum crimen sine lege. She explains that
although international courts from Nuremberg to The Hague have engaged in
common law-style law making, they nevertheless adhered to the crux of the legality
principle—foreseeability. Van Schaack, supra note 2, at 178–180. Still, she contends
ICL has reached a more mature stage and thus should begin to respect a more
robust conception of legality. Id. at 192. Gallant also endorses this foreseeability
test. He states, of the ICC, “[p]roblems of legality in crime definition should arise
only if crimes are not sufficiently clearly defined (do not meet lex certa) or if the
court interprets them in a broad and unforeseeable manner, in violation of its
statute.” See GALLANT, supra note 4, at 336, 362–66.
210
C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335-C Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 34 (1995); see also
Shahabuddeen, supra note 10, at 1012, 1017 (emphasis added) (“ ‘[A]s was indicated
by the European Court of Human Rights in C.R. v the United Kingdom, the principle
of nullum crimen sine lege does not bar development of the law through clarification
or interpretation 'provided that the resultant development is consistent with the
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argument goes, ambiguities in the law can be resolved through
interpretation, rather than automatically choosing the
interpretation that favors the accused.
Although “[t]he Rome Statute does not expressly admit the
qualification of foreseeability,”211 it is possible that the court will
read strict construction this way. Judges of the ICTY and the
Special Court of Sierra Leone (“SCSL”) embraced a similar
foreseeability formula for nullum crimen sine lege and strict
construction.212
This foreseeability and consistency rule has its allure. For
one, it has the imprimatur of the ECtHR, which would allow the
ICC to claim adherence to international human rights principles
in construing the reach of Article 22(2). Second, it seems to
recognize that there is something to strict construction beyond
lenity, such that even if the ICC used the sources of law and
techniques of interpretation that its statute and this Article
suggest it ought to, there would remain some constraint on
judicial overreaching.
It bears noting though that the ECtHR formula derives from
a very different institutional context. The ECtHR hears claims
from individuals who argue that a state has violated their rights
under the European Convention of Human Rights (“European
Convention”). Much like a U.S. federal court examining a state
court’s interpretation of state law, the ECtHR is very deferential
to national courts’ interpretations of their own laws.213

essence of the offence and could reasonably be foreseen.’ So, it is the essence of the
offence—or its ‘very essence’—that governs.”); CASSESE, supra note 7, at 150.
211
Grover, A Call to Arms, supra note 14, at 555.
212
See supra notes 10 and 11 (discussing ICTY judges’ embracing of this
foreseeability formula); Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No. SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E),
Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack of Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment),
¶ 25 (Spec. Ct. for Sierra Leone May 31, 2004) (“ ‘In interpreting the principle
nullum crimen sine lege, it is critical to determine whether the underlying conduct at
the time of its commission was punishable. The emphasis on conduct, rather than on
the specific description of the offence in substantive criminal law, is of primary
relevance.’ In other words it must be ‘foreseeable and accessible to a possible
perpetrator that his concrete conduct was punishable.’ ”) (citing Prosecutor v.
Hadz̆ihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-PT, Decision on Joint Challenge to Jurisdiction,
¶ 62 (Nov. 12, 2002)).
213
C.R. v. United Kingdom, 335-C Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 34 (1995). See also Theodor
Meron, Editorial Comment, Revival of Customary International Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L
L. 817, 826 (2005).
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The European Convention, which the ECtHR is charged with
interpreting, and the Rome Statute articulate radically different
positions on the role of legality in the context of grave
international crimes. The European Convention has an explicit
carve-out for crimes based on the general principles of civilized
nations that was designed to dispense with nullum crimen sine
lege arguments in the context of serious international crimes.214
The Rome Statute, which deals only with serious international
crimes,215 has departed from this compromised view of legality in
the context of international crimes through Article 22’s
guarantee of nullum crimen sine lege and strict construction.216
Reflecting this institutional context, the ECtHR’s test is
insufficiently rigorous.
At first blush, foreseeability seems
reasonably clear: Was it foreseeable that the court read the
Rome Statute so as to include the defendant’s conduct? However,
it raises the question, foreseeable to whom? To the defendant?
To a defendant with a good international criminal defense lawyer
on retainer?
To states?
Moreover, commentators have
questioned, particularly in light of international judges’ track
record of expansive interpretation, whether the foreseeability
test really “exclude[s] anything.”217
The second part of the test, which asks whether the
interpretation is consistent with the “essence of the offense,”218 is
even more problematic. International crimes are hard to reduce
to their essence, at least without reducing them all to the same
crime—as crimes that offend all humanity or crimes that offend
the international community. If one tries to distill each of the
214
See GALLANT, supra note 4, at 203. FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 164. Article
7 of the European Convention provides: “No punishment without law 1. No one shall
be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not
constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it
was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was
applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. 2. This Article shall not
prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at
the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of
law recognised by civilised nations.” European Convention on Human Rights, art. 7
Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (emphasis added).
215
But see deGuzman, supra note 103, at 1408 (questioning whether all
international crimes are grave).
216
See supra Part I.A.
217
Darryl Robinson, Legality and Our Contradictory Commitments: Some
Thoughts About How We Think, 103 AM. SOC. INT’L L. 104, 104 (2009) (quoted in
GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES, supra note 14, at 171).
218
See discussion supra note 210.
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categories of crimes to its essence, problems persist. For
example, scholars and courts have thus far been unable to come
up with a satisfying core conception or unifying theory of crimes
against humanity.219 Perhaps genocide is some serious, harmful
act done with the intent to destroy in whole or in part an
enumerated group, but this “essence” leaves open critical
questions about the boundaries of the harmful acts, and mens rea
requirements across groups of perpetrators who play varying
roles. Perhaps war crimes could be reduced to serious violations
of the laws of war? Again, this approach seems to eviscerate the
advancements in ICL of the last twenty-five years. If this
reductive, essentialist approach is all that strict construction
demands, it seems a significant step backwards in the
development of ICL. Like foreseeability, the “essence” test seems
to permit just about anything.
For these reasons, this Article proposes another formula for
strict construction or, viewed differently, an alternative to strict
construction when the lenity canon is inevitably read out of the
statute through interpretation.
IV. A BETTER CONSTRUCTION OF STRICT CONSTRUCTION
This Part offers a reading of Article 22(2) that is both
meaningful and realistic in the context of ICL. In broad terms, it
agrees with other commentators that Article 22(2) is an
admonition to judges to exercise restraint in interpreting crimes
and making law220 which, like it or not, they will inevitably do.
219
See Margaret M. deGuzman, The Elusive Essence of Crimes Against
Humanity, in FOR THE SAKE OF PRESENT AND FUTURE GENERATIONS: ESSAYS ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW, CRIME AND JUSTICE IN HONOUR OF ROGER S. CLARK 1, 12
(Suzannah Linton et al. eds., Brill/Nijhoff, 2015) (noting a tension in any attempt to
define crimes against humanity between the goal of distinguishing crimes against
humanity from domestic crimes and the goal of capturing all conduct “shock[ing] to
humanity’s conscience”). See also Leila Nadya Sadat, Crimes Against Humanity in
the Modern Age, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 334, 334 (2013) (noting the “absence of a
consistent definition and uniform interpretation of crimes against humanity has
made it difficult to establish the theory underlying such crimes and to prosecute
them in particular cases,” and noting that Pretrial Chambers of the ICC have
reached varying conclusions on the state or organizational policy requirement).
220
See GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES, supra note 14, at 202 (arguing that “the
rule of strict construction should require judges of the Court to ‘interpret crimes in
the Statute in a moderate manner’, meaning that they are interpreting and applying
existing definitions of crimes rather than crafting new ones and favouring the
suspect or accused when the intent of the provision as it relates to the interpretive
issue before the Court is ‘left in doubt’ ”); Shahabuddeen, supra note 10, at 1017
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This Article refines this prescription to tailor it to the legitimate
aims of strict construction. Borrowing from Professor John
Jeffries’s work on lenity and vagueness in statutory construction,
it argues that judges must: avoid unfair surprise to defendants;
avoid extending crimes to conduct that states parties anticipated
and intended not to cover; make—or interpret—law in a way that
leads to greater clarity in the law; and, finally, avoid case-specific
lawmaking.221
This Part then examines the application of these guidelines
in the context of the Rome Statute’s idiosyncratic blend of
statutory text that is sometimes specific and sometimes vague
and contains references to loose sources of law such as
international law and general principles derived from national
systems. It also addresses statutory interpretation in the face of
“constructive ambiguity,” language that was left ambiguous by
design due to an inability of drafters to reach an agreement on
any one meaning.222
In Legality, Vagueness, and the Construction of Penal
Statutes, Professor John Jeffries rejects lenity and strict
construction because he finds the underlying justification of
notice and separation of powers unconvincing in the domestic
context. He argues that when judges face ambiguity, rather than
picking the most lenient interpretation, for which he sees no
justification in domestic criminal law, judges should pick the best
interpretation.223 This Article does not go so far as to reject

(“Licence is not appropriate; a useful brake is supplied by the important principle of
nullum crimen sine lege and associated doctrines. It is difficult to exaggerate the
importance of that principle. But perhaps it should not be exaggerated.”); Joseph
Powderly, The Rome Statute and the Attempted Corseting of the Interpretive Judicial
Function: Reflections on Sources of Law and Interpretive Techniques, in THE LAW
AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 444, 498 (2015) (arguing
that the drafters of the Rome Statute intended Article 22 to constrain judges, but
that it should not preclude reasonable interpretation and development of the law).
221
Jeffries’s recommendations are offered as constraints on judges that remain
even without lenity. Jeffries, supra note 22, at 195.
222
See discussion supra notes 52, 130.
223
Jeffries, supra note 22, at 221 (“Sometimes statutory ambiguity presents an
essentially binary choice. The law is either A or B; whichever is chosen, future
coverage is fairly clear. In such a case, strict construction would dictate exculpation,
and this would be true even though the actor’s conduct was both dangerous and
reprehensible, even though there was no prospect of unfair surprise, and even
though the result left an irrational gap in the law. In my view, this approach does
not make sense. Faced with this kind of binary choice—where neither outcome is
precluded by express or implied legislative decision, where there is no threat of
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lenity. It merely acknowledges, as did Judge Shahabuddeen,
that few ambiguities are likely to remain after judges employ the
various interpretive devices at their disposal. ICC judges are
unlikely to be faced with a clear “binary choice” between two
interpretations of a crime standing in equipoise224 or, perhaps,
judges will seldom recognize equipoise. Given this reality, these
interpretive guidelines may offer a better way of reading strict
construction than the reductionist ECtHR formula discussed
above.
In lieu of picking the most lenient interpretation of a statute,
Jeffries advocates interpreting criminal statutes by considering
the merits of the particular issue, not the particular case, at
hand,225 subject to “three generalized constraints”: courts “should
avoid usurpation of legislative authority,” courts “should avoid
interpretations that threaten unfair surprise,” and, finally,
judges “confronting ambiguity in a penal statute might usefully
ask whether a proposed resolution makes the law more or less
certain.”226
This Part advocates a variation of this interpretive mandate
tailored to the justifications for strict construction at the ICC.
Judges should choose the best interpretation of the statute in
light of the issue at hand, subject to the certain constraints
designed to address the valid objectives of strict construction in
the ICC context. First, judges should avoid usurpations of state
authority. This inquiry looks to whether states have delegated
lawmaking authority and reconceives the objects and purposes
inquiry.
Second, judges should avoid unfair surprise to
defendants. This constraint looks at the strength of the support
for a particular interpretation. Where the statute is ambiguous
or vague, the absence of a preexisting international norm
criminalizing the conduct creates a rebuttable presumption of
unfair surprise. Finally, judges should attempt to clarify ICL
and international law generally. In most instances, this will
[unfair] surprise, and where neither construction embraces an open-ended
commitment to ad hoc criminalization—a judge should do whatever seems right.”).
224
Id.
225
Id. (“[I]n the criminal law, this urge toward particularity should be avoided.
In this context, judicial lawmaking is best where it is not fact-specific. The trouble
with fact-specific innovation is that it invites further innovation on other facts; it
implies an open-ended, flexible, progressive character inimical to the appropriate
rule-of-law constraints on the use of penal sanctions.”).
226
Id. at 220–21.
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mean reading ICL consistently with IHL and international
human rights. However, there will be instances where a
narrower reading of ICL is warranted, such as where states
intended to exclude the conduct from the crime or where there is
a risk of unfair surprise. In these instances, ICC judges may
clarify the law through transparent reasoning on how they
reached a particular definition of the crime and why it diverged
from IHL or human rights norms. These guidelines better
address the concerns that undergird Article 22’s guarantee of
strict construction than any of the orderings or approaches
described in Part III above.
A.

Avoiding Usurpations of State Authority

Avoiding usurpation of legislative authority can be
translated in the ICC context to a command to interpret the
Rome Statute consistently with state intent, where it is possible
to ascertain, and to avoid including within a crime definition
something that states parties clearly meant to exclude. To
borrow the words of an ICTY trial chamber, to respect the intent
of the legislature means simply “not to fill omissions in
legislation when this can be said to have been deliberate.”227
Thus, some gap filling and interpreting is permitted: “[if] the
omission was accidental, it is usual to supply the missing words
to give the legislation the meaning intended.”228 This prohibition
on filling intentional blanks in statutory coverage is in essence
the French notion of strict construction.229
This prescription addresses concerns about respecting state
intent and encouraging state participation in the Rome regime.
It also adequately addresses any concerns about separation of
powers, which, as discussed above, at any rate are weak at the

227
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, ¶ 412 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998). Schabas, supra note 10, at 854.
Jeffries contends that separation of powers does not explain much, but in the context
of statutory interpretation it demands merely “that judicial lawmaking not be
inconsistent with legislative choice.” Jeffries, supra note 22, at 204–5 (“This means
chiefly that courts should not place on a statute a meaning that its text will not bear,
or that is plainly contradicted by legislative history, or that does unnecessary
violence to the policy expressed in some other enactment.”).
228
Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement, ¶ 412 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998); Schabas, supra note 10, at 854;
Jeffries, supra note 22, at 204–5.
229
See discussion supra note 28.
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ICC. As discussed below, there is no usurpation where states
have delegated lawmaking authority through vague language or
constructive ambiguity.
By contrast, circular teleological
analysis invoking the need to “end impunity” to justify crime
expansion runs afoul of this constraint.
1.

Vagueness and Constructive Ambiguity as Delegation

It is important to be clear on what qualifies as usurpation.
Where language in the Rome Statute is specific and clear, there
is a strong argument that states were not delegating lawmaking
authority and, therefore, judicial lawmaking would amount to
usurpation. By contrast, vague provisions or provisions that
incorporate by reference other fields of law, such as IHL, suggest
that states were delegating lawmaking power.230 Interpretation
and application of the law is therefore necessary and consistent
with the intent of states parties.231 Still, judges must exercise
care to interpret broad provisions in a way that does not offend
the next principle of unfair surprise to defendants.232
Constructive ambiguity, like vagueness, also constitutes a
delegation. Where states agreed to a compromise definition in
the Rome Statute that was intentionally ambiguous, as in the
case of gender,233 they were on notice that the court might land
on an interpretation that differed from their own by consulting
other sources of law and using standard tools of interpretation,

230
Danner, supra note 116, at 44–49 (discussing the possibility that the Security
Council delegated lawmaking authority to the ICTY and that the ICTY was acting
as a faithful agent in lawmaking); Ginsburg, supra note 115, at 641–47; GROVER,
INTERPRETING CRIMES, supra note 14, at 401 (arguing that “the strict construction
imperative is rebutted where States choose to insert in the Rome Statute opentextured language, thereby signalling the delegation of a greater than normal degree
of law-making power to judges”).
231
See discussion supra notes 112–113 (discussing separation of powers and
delegation).
232
International judges seem to be aware of the need for care in interpreting
broad provisions so as not to unfairly surprise defendants. See Van Schaack, supra
note 2, at 138–140 (discussing the ICTY’s caselaw on the legality of the crimes
against humanity of “other inhumane acts”); see also Prosecutor v. Blagojevic, Case
No. IT-02-60-T, Judgement, ¶ 625 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan.
17, 2005) (noting that “the principle of legality requires that a trier of fact exercise
great caution in finding that an alleged act, not regulated elsewhere in Article 5 of
the Statute, forms part of this crime [of “other inhumane acts”]: norms of criminal
law must always provide individuals with sufficient notice of what is criminal
behaviour and what is not”) (quoted in Van Schaack, supra note 2, at n.79).
233
See discussion supra note 128–133.
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such as those set out in the Vienna Convention. Ascertaining the
intentionality of the ambiguity will, of course, require recourse to
travaux préparatoires of the Rome Statute. The task for judges is
to determine whether the ambiguity was intentional or merely a
drafting error. For intentionally ambiguous provisions, like
vague ones, judges must ascertain whether, in light of applicable
international law and general principles derived from national
judicial systems and relevant tools of interpretation of
international law, extending the criminal prohibition of the Rome
Statute to the conduct in question makes sense.234
By contrast, where there is strong evidence that States Party
meant for certain conduct to be excluded from the coverage of a
crime, reading conduct into an existing crime under the Rome
Statute would amount to a usurpation of state intent. The Rome
Statute’s treatment of chemical weapons arguably is an example
of such an intentional exclusion.235 The Rome Statute’s war
crimes provisions relating to “employing poison or poisoned
weapons” and “asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and all
analogous liquid, materials or devices” are ambiguous.236
Plausible arguments can be made on the face of the provision
that the language includes or excludes biological and chemical
weapons.237 If states intended to exclude chemical weapons from

234

See discussion supra note 128–133.
See Beth Van Schaack, Chemical Weapons Use Returns to Syria, JUST
SECURITY (Aug. 8, 2016, 11:09 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/32309/chemicalweapons-returns-syria/ (“Coming cold to the text of the ICC Statute, one would
assume the genus crimes of ‘employing asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and
all analogous liquids, materials or devices’ would encompass the use of chemical
(and maybe some biological) weapons. Knowing the treaty’s drafting history,
however, reveals that a provision specifically penalizing the use of ‘chemical
weapons’ was deliberately rejected by delegates as part of a compromise around the
inclusion of nuclear weapons.”).
236
See Alex Whiting, The International Criminal Court, the Islamic State, and
Chemical Weapons, JUST SECURITY (Nov. 4, 2015, 10:36 AM), https://www.justsecu
rity.org/27359/icc-islamic-state-chemical-weapons/.
237
Whether or not the Rome Statute prohibits the use of chemical weapons has
been the subject of recent academic debate relating to the use of chemical weapons
in Syria and Iraq. See, e.g., Dapo Akande, Can the ICC Prosecute for Use of Chemical
Weapons in Syria?, EJIL: TALK! (Aug. 23, 2013), http://www.ejiltalk.org/can-the-iccprosecute-for-use-of-chemical-weapons-in-syria/; Kevin Jon Heller, The Rome Statute
Does Not Criminalise Chemical and Biological Weapons, OPINIO JURIS (Nov. 5,
2015), http://opiniojuris.org/2015/11/05/why-the-rome-statute-does-not-criminalisechemical-and-biological-weapons/; Ralf Trapp, The Investigation Into the Islamic
State and Chemical Weapons, JUST SECURITY (Oct. 27, 2015, 9:40 AM),
https://www.justsecurity.org/27116/investigation-islamic-state-chemical-weapons/.
235
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the ambit of the provision, then judges should not read the crime
into the statute on the back end. Such a result may feel deeply
dissatisfying in the face of horrific acts deserving of
condemnation, but is nevertheless superior from a legality
perspective and from the perspective of maintaining continued
participation of states in the ICC regime.
When ICC judges do then engage in judicial lawmaking, as
they should with cases of constructive ambiguity, the process is
more democratic than it may seem. Because ascertaining
general principles of international law and general principles
derived from national judicial systems forces judges to look at
international conventions and state practice, it is inherently an
inquiry into the level of consensus on a given issue.238 Thus, in
essence, Article 21 directs judges to ascertain whether there is a
consensus that particular conduct falls within the ambit of a
particular crime of the Rome Statute, not as a legislative matter,
but through interpretation. Since an estimation of consensus is
part of the inquiry, judges are less likely to enact controversial
expansions of the law.239 In essence, judges must wait for a norm
to develop.
This recognition of a delegation and, in turn, refusal to
recognize a usurpation, is consistent with Article 22’s command
that ambiguities in crime definitions be construed in favor of the
defendant. As explained above, the most sensible reading of the
Rome Statute makes clear that an ambiguity, for the purposes of
Article 22(2)’s command of lenity, is not an ambiguity on the face
of the Rome Statute, but rather an ambiguity remaining after all
sources of law in Article 21 and standard tools of interpretation
are exhausted.240

238
Cf. Jacobs, supra note 18, at 19 (noting that “when asking judges to identify
and apply customary law, we are necessarily asking them, maybe not to act as
legislators, but at least to think as ones. In this sense, the reference to political or
moral considerations by judges is in fact legitimate when it comes to this source of
law” but arguing against the ICC’s use of CIL in interpreting crimes). It bears noting
that critics of traditional CIL have argued that it is undemocratic. ILC CIL 1, supra
note 18, ¶ 98 n.235.
239
Jeffries, supra note 22, at 205 (arguing that separation of powers “also
means . . . that in confronting statutory ambiguity, courts should ordinarily avoid
large-scale innovation. In other words, courts should avoid, where possible,
interpretations that embrace controversial perceptions of public policy”).
240
See supra Part III.
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Object and Purpose, Defined Properly

This notion of avoiding usurpations of state authority and
respecting state intent includes a teleological inquiry into “object
and purpose,” but it differs from the one courts and
commentators currently employ. The invocation of the object and
purpose of “ending impunity” to justify a number of fairly big
leaps has been rightly criticized.241 Under a correct view of the
object and purpose of the Rome Statute, the best interpretation is
not necessarily the broadest, because the object and purpose of
the Rome Statute is not simply to “end impunity.”242 Rather, it is
to condemn and punish people who have been found guilty of
committing gross violations of ICL through fair trials conducted
in accordance with international human rights and the rule of
law.
Certainly, the preamble of the Rome Statute announces the
goal of “ending impunity,” but the object and purpose of the Rome
Statute is far bigger than this rather lofty, but ultimately
circular, aim. In a human rights-enforcing criminal institution
like the ICC, it seems fair to assume that the framers sought to
end impunity for—or start punishing—people who in fact have
committed international crimes. One need not even assume this,
however, since the Rome Statute itself says so. The language on
ending impunity is more nuanced than is typically admitted. The
Rome Statute affirms that: “[T]he most serious crimes of concern
to the international community as a whole must not go
unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured
by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing
international cooperation.”243 Thus, the Rome Statute announces
the rather obvious goal of seeking to punish people who have
committed “the most serious crimes of concern to the
241

See supra note 15.
Leena Grover has another way of cabining object and purpose analysis. She
argues that judges, to they extent they engage in an inquiry into objects and
purposes, “should, to the greatest extent possible, be limited to commenting about
the mischief that the relevant criminal prohibition—as opposed to the Rome regime
as a whole—is intended to address.” GROVER, INTERPRETING CRIMES, supra note 14,
at 217. This solution is an improvement in that it ends resort to the empty “ending
impunity” mantra of crime expansion, but it also risks expansion through a
conflation of the object and purpose of a Rome Statute prohibition with the object
and purpose of the underlying IHR or IHL norm. For that reason, this Article
suggests that inquiry into the objects and purposes of the Rome Statute requires
recognition of the ICC as a human rights-respecting criminal justice system.
243
Rome Statute, supra note 1, pmbl. (emphasis added).
242
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international community” through “effective prosecution,” not the
goal of punishing people for all serious conduct that the court
may later declare to be crimes.
Other aspects of the Rome Statute lend support to ending
the use of object and purpose analysis as a free pass to crime
expansion. The Preamble also states that the states parties are
“[r]esolved to guarantee lasting respect for and the enforcement
of international justice.”244 Guaranteeing lasting respect for
international justice arguably counsels against aggressive
judicial crime creation. Recalling Justice Jackson’s admonition
at the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg—“we must
never forget that the record on which we judge these defendants
today is the record on which history will judge us tomorrow”—
overly expansive interpretations of crimes to fit the facts, it
would seem, ultimately undermine respect for international
justice.245 As for the guarantee to enforce international justice,
this guarantee, like the notion of ending impunity for crimes, is
question begging—enforcement of just what criminal prohibition?
The use of the term “justice” seems to require fidelity to law; not
just punishment. Finally, the Rome Statute’s many fair trialrelated provisions, including the explicit requirement that trials
comply with international human rights246 and the Article 22
provisions on legality, are evidence that the ICC is not to seek
convictions at all cost.
It bears emphasis that this teleological inquiry into the
Rome Statute should not be conflated with a teleological inquiry
into an underlying IHL convention upon which the ICC was
founded.247 The object and purpose of the underlying convention
is likely to be to expand international humanitarian protection,
as it should be.248 However, as noted, that is not the primary
244

Id. (emphasis added).
ROBERT H. JACKSON, OPENING STATEMENT NUREMBERG TRIALS (1945),
http://www.pbs.org/wnet/supremecourt/personality/sources_document12.html.
246
Id. at art. 21(3) (“The application and interpretation of law pursuant to this
article must be consistent with internationally recognized human rights . . .”).
247
See generally Carstens, supra note 77 (describing difficulties in interpreting
transplanted treaty rules).
248
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Hadz̆ihasanovic, Case No. IT-01-47-AR72, Separate
and Partially Dissenting Opinion of Judge Hunt Command Responsibility Appeal,
¶ 22 (July 16, 2003) (arguing in support of extending liability based on command
responsibility for acts committed prior to a commander’s taking charge and citing as
support the object and purpose of IHL: “The object and purpose of Additional
Protocol I is, according to its Preamble, to ‘reaffirm and develop the provisions
245
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object and purpose of the Rome Statute. The object and purpose
of the Rome Statute is to punish people found guilty, through a
fair process, of international crimes. Thus, contrary to the
typical analysis in international courts, the teleological inquiry
into underlying IHL conventions offers a strong argument in
favor of reading the Rome Statute more narrowly than the
underlying IHL convention.
This interpretation of the Vienna Convention’s teleological
inquiry may lead to greater “fragmentation” in international
law,249 but perhaps not as much as it may seem. Pursuant to
Article 21 of the Rome Statute and the “general rule” of the
Vienna Convention, judges still may consider the underlying IHL
or international human rights “source” norm to assist in finding
the “ordinary meaning” of a term in one of the Rome Statute’s
crime definitions.250 It merely may not shroud expansions in the
law in the justification of achieving the Rome Statute’s purported
“object and purpose” of “ending impunity.”
The object and purpose of the Rome Statute, properly
understood, includes an element of gravity. As noted above, and
exemplified by the “most serious crimes of concern to the
international community” language in the Preamble, the Rome
Statute gravity requirements are sprinkled throughout the

protecting the victims of armed conflicts and to supplement measures intended to
reinforce their application’, which accords neatly with the object and purpose of
international humanitarian law generally: ‘The aim of international humanitarian
law is to protect the human being and to safeguard the dignity of man in the
extreme situation of war. The provisions of international humanitarian law have
always been tailored to fit human requirements. They are bound to an ideal: the
protection of man from the consequences of brute force’ ”); see also supra notes 10,
11, and 15.
249
See generally Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of Its Sixty-First Session,
¶ 251(1), UN Doc A/61/10 (2006), [hereinafter ILC Report on Fragmentation]. See
also Michael Waibel, Interpretive Communities in International Law, in
INTERPRETATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 164 (Andrea Bianchi et al. eds., 2015)
(discussing the fragmentation of interpretive communities and noting that “[t]he
extensive discourse on fragmentation in international law oscillates between the two
extreme poles: the view that fragmentation poses a mortal threat to the
international legal order, or that it is a natural outgrowth of international law’s
advanced state of development, mirroring earlier developments in national law”).
250
See Carstens, supra note 77, at 236 (noting that “a transplanted treaty rule
might become so ubiquitous within a particular series of treaties that an ‘ordinary
meaning’ can be ascribed to the common terms within it by reference to the wider
body of earlier treaties” but noting that “the [other] primary elements” including
object and purpose of the general rule are less applicable than “ordinary meaning”).
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definitions of crimes.251
The Rome Statute also requires
consideration of gravity as a jurisdictional matter and as a
matter of prosecutorial discretion in deciding whether to bring
charges.252
At least one ICC judge appears to endorse an understanding
of Article 22(2) that recognizes a role for the Vienna Convention
and yet keeps teleological analysis from swallowing strict
construction. In Ngudjolo, Judge Van den Wyngaert wrote a
concurring opinion to express her views on the proper
interpretation of the Rome Statute’s provision on forms of
criminal responsibility.253 She noted that “the Court must first
apply the applicable rules of interpretation, as provided for by
the Statute and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,”
including the travaux préparatoires.254 However, emphasizing
the importance of the strict construction or, as she called it, the
in dubio pro reo command of Article 22(2),255 she rejected the
Vienna Convention’s teleological inquiry into the “objects and
purposes” of a treaty.256
B.

Avoiding Unfair Surprise

This discussion on the Rome Statute’s “object and purpose”
relates to the next proposed guideline for strict construction—
avoiding unfair surprise. This prescription is akin to the ECtHR
notion of foreseeability,257 but makes clear that foreseeability is
judged from the perspective of the defendant. In reading the
statute, supplemented by consultation of international law and
general principles where needed, judges must consider whether a
defendant could reasonably have understood his conduct to be
criminal. This focus speaks to the underlying human rights
concern about notice to defendants. Where the court is treading
new ground, it must consider whether the defendant could have
reasonably anticipated the criminality of his conduct.
251

See supra Part III.B.3.
See deGuzman, supra note 103, at 1405.
253
Prosecutor v. Ngudjolo, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/12, Concurring Opinion of
Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert, ¶ 10 (Dec. 18, 2012).
254
Id. ¶¶ 10–13.
255
Id. ¶ 19 (stating “I believe that the express inclusion of the in dubio pro reo
standard in Article 22(2) of the Statute is a highly significant characteristic of the
Statute.”).
256
Id. ¶ 18.
257
See supra Part III.D.
252
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This prescription has more bite to it than it may seem. At
the ad hoc tribunals and the SCSL, jurisdiction over defendants
whose crimes often predated the courts’ statutes was contingent
on the existence at the time of the defendant’s acts of an
applicable crime in international law,258 either through a treaty
or customary international law. By contrast, at the ICC, the
judges arguably need not find evidence that conduct is criminal
under customary international law. Rather, judges may consult
customary international law and general principles to help them
interpret the language of Rome Statute.259 If these sources
support a particular reading of a term or of a general prohibition,
then the judges may use this reading as support for the
proposition that the conduct is included in the Rome Statute’s
crime.
Although the Rome Statute does not purport to codify
customary international law, a preexisting international criminal
norm strongly suggests that the risk of unfair surprise is low.
Where language in a crime definition is ambiguous, and there is
weak evidence that particular conduct is criminal according to
the general principles of international law, including customary
international law, the risk of unfair surprise is high. In essence,
the absence of a customary international law norm criminalizing
particular conduct amounts to a presumption of unfair surprise.
This presumption can be overcome through consultation of
general principles derived from national judicial systems or
perhaps from evidence that customary international law and

258
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on the
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Case No. IT-98-32-T, Trial
Judgement, ¶¶ 198–203 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 29, 2002)
(finding that the court lacked jurisdiction over the defendant for the crime of
“violence to life and person” since it was unconvinced that “violence to life and
person” amounted to a crime under customary international law).
259
For example, in the ICC’s first case, Lubanga, the Trial Chamber consulted
IHL treaties and customary IHL to understand the meaning of the Rome Statute’s
war crime based on “use of children to participate [] in hostilities.” In reaching a
broad definition of “use to participate in the hostilities” the Trial Chamber relied on
customary international law evidence that use of children in support roles was
prohibited, not that IHL showed that it was a crime. Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case
No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgement Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 619–628
(Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter “Lubanga Judgment”]; cf. Marko Milanovic, Is the Rome
Statute Binding on Individuals? (And Why We Should Care), 9 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST.
25, 27 (2011) (asking whether the Rome Statute is jurisdictional or substantive).

2017]

ROME STATUTE STRICT CONSTRUCTION

97

treaty law understands a particular term in a particular way,
even if it does not recognize that it is a crime, but the evidence
must be very strong.
Thus, strict construction can be read as a command to
engage in more rigorous customary international law analysis
than international courts have sometimes employed.260
As
Joseph Powderly has noted of the customary international law
analysis of the ad hoc tribunals,
There is . . . a legitimate concern that recourse to ‘new’ norms of
customary international law, identified on the basis of
questionable evidence of state practice and opinio juris, may be
used as a means of concealing the arbitrary development of the
law and its fraught relationship with the principle of legality.261

The flexibility of customary international law analysis inherently
lends itself to the risk that the existence and content of the norm
depend on the eye of the beholder, and courts must be careful in
basing expansive interpretations of crimes in arguments based
on customary international law.
This guideline that courts avoid unfair surprise is not,
however, a requirement that any particular defendant have
actual notice that his conduct was illegal.262 The question is
whether a reasonable person in the defendant’s position would
have been on notice that her conduct was criminal. There is no
unfair surprise where there is sufficiently clear support for an
interpretation in some source of law recognized whether or not

260
Judge Roberston’s dissent from an SCSL’s trial chamber’s finding of
jurisdiction for the crime of recruiting children into armed forces accuses the
majority of suspect customary international law analysis and defends a more
rigorous inquiry into customary international law. Prosecutor v. Norman, Case No.
SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E), Dissenting Opinion of Justice Robertson, ¶ 22 (Spec. Ct. for
Sierra Leone May 31, 2004).
261
Powderly, supra note 198, at 237; see also id. at 236 (“There is a definite
danger then that the convenient selectiveness of established and newly identified
customary rules is being used as a fail-safe mechanism when compliance with the
principle of legality is brought into question as a consequence. Some critical scholars
might even go as far as to say that, before the international criminal tribunals,
customary international law is to be considered inherently malleable and capable of
saying whatever you want it to say. This is perhaps excessively cynical and certainly
only attaches to a minority of cases; however, the critique is not without some
merit.”).
262
The defendant in the ICC’s first case made a notice or ignorance of the law
argument, which the Pretrial Chamber rejected on the basis that the Rome Statute
itself had made enlistment of child soldiers a crime prior to Lubanga’s conduct. See
Milanovic, supra note 259, at 34.
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the defendant knew about it.263 The further from ICL and IHL
the norm is, arguably, the less reasonable it would be to impute
knowledge of the norm to the defendant. It puts the onus on
military and civilian leaders in conflict situations to know the
legal landscape in which they are operating. This landscape
includes not only IHL, but also international human rights law
and ICL, both customary and treaty-based. It may include notice
stemming from general principles derived from national systems,
but these domestic legal principles are an area to be treated with
extreme care since the risk of unfair surprise is high. While
there may be unfair surprise concerns with attributing
knowledge of international law to international defendants, these
concerns are far greater still when the court begins to assume a
mastery of comparative criminal law unless there is near
uniformity on a rule.
Thus, if judges are inquiring into the possibility of unfair
surprise due to a new application or interpretation of an
ambiguous or vague provision of the Rome Statute, and are
looking to customary international law for guidance, as this
Article suggests they should, judges should look for strong
evidence of both state practice and opinio juris in support of a
crime under customary international law or, at a minimum, of a
clear international norm supporting a particular reading of a
Rome Statute crime. This traditional approach to identifying
customary international law may not be optimal from a
“utopian,” ending-impunity vantage point,264 but it is more
defensible from the vantage point of legality and strict
construction.

263
Here, the author agrees with Gallant, who adopts Jerome Hall’s argument
that “[i]f an act can reasonably be construed as within the ambit of definition of the
crime existing at the time of the act (whether statutory, common law, or
international law), the actor is sufficiently warned so that a conviction will not a
violate the customary international law version of nullum crimen sine lege.”
GALLANT, supra note 4, at 360 (quoting Jerome Hall, Nulla Poena Sine Lege, 47
YALE L.J. 165 (1937)).
264
ILC CIL 1, supra note 18, ¶ 98 (describing modern arguments that
customary international law norms could be found on either state practice or opinio
juris alone).
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Maximizing Clarity

Finally, judges should aim to make—or interpret—law in a
way that leads to greater clarity in the law.265 Jeffries proposes
that judges ask the following questions:
Would this interpretation, taken as precedent, constrain future
applications? Or would it merely multiply the possibilities?
Would the decision resolve the ambiguity in the law, or merely
exploit it? Of course, not every rule is a good rule, but the lack
of any rule is usually a bad idea. To be avoided, therefore, is an
interpretation that creates or perpetuates openendedness in the
criminal law.266

ICL could benefit from clarification. Despite the codification of
ICL in the Rome Statute and the Elements of Crimes, ICL is still
a relatively nascent field and many critical questions on the
nature and elements of criminal responsibility remain to be
answered.267
Clarifying the norms often will mean interpreting them
consistently with underlying international human rights and
IHL norms. Interpreting the Rome Statute consistently with
international human rights norms and IHL will often make
sense, particularly since the Rome Statute often explicitly directs
judges to interpret the crimes consistently with those bodies of
law. As the International Law Commission (“ILC”) has noted in
its findings on the “fragmentation” of international law:
International law as a legal system. International law is a legal
system. Its rules and principles (i.e. its norms) act in relation to
and should be interpreted against the background of other rules
and principles. As a legal system, international law is not a
random collection of such norms.
There are meaningful
relationships between them.268
265
Sadat and Jolly likewise list clarifying the law as one of their proposed
principles of interpretation. See Sadat & Jolly, supra note 14, at 764.
266
Jeffries, supra note 22, at 220–221 (“Such an interpretation should be
avoided not because it would be unfair or unwise in the instant case (that might or
might not be true), but because it would invite abuse in the future.”).
267
See, e.g., Valerie Oosterveld, Sexual Slavery and the International Criminal
Court: Advancing International Law, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605, 608–09, 622–23
(2004) (discussing the lack of clarity on the elements of and relationship between
sexual slavery and enslavement). See deGuzman, supra note 219, at 1 (noting that
the meaning of the state policy requirement for crimes against humanity in the
Rome Statute is unclear).
268
See ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 249, ¶ 251(1) (“Norms may
thus exist at higher and lower hierarchical levels, their formulation may involve
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Moreover, the ILC has recommended harmonization: “It is a
generally accepted principle that when several norms bear on a
single issue they should, to the extent possible, be interpreted so
as to give rise to a single set of compatible obligations.”269
This goal of increasing clarity in—and harmonization of—the
law is in tension with this Article’s argument that the objects and
purposes of underlying IHL and human rights treaties not be
confused with the object and purpose of the Rome Statute.270
Indeed, this Article’s object and purpose thesis permits at least
some divergence between IHL and ICL. As the negative reaction
in the military community to the ICTY’s Gotovina decision on
targeting illustrates, clarity, at least in international law as a
whole, often is not enhanced by a different norm in ICL and
IHL.271 Likewise, had the ICC, in its judgments in the Lubanga
case, decided, international human rights and IHL principles
notwithstanding, that only use of children in fighting and not in
support roles sufficed for the crime of enlistment and recruitment
of child soldiers, there is some risk that the narrow ICL norm
announced would have muddied the waters for the human rights
and IHL norms.
Indeed, the United Nations Special
Representative of the Secretary General on Children and Armed
Conflict, who testified as an expert in the case, seemed very
concerned that ICL, international human rights law and IHL be
striking the same note.272 To be sure, there is a cost in
recognizing a narrower ICL rule.
Nevertheless, despite the overlap in the fields of ICL, IHL,
and international human rights and the benefits of
harmonization, there is a strong argument that ICL is what the
ILC would call a “[s]pecial (self-contained) regime” distinct from
IHL or international human rights law due to the distinctive
requirements of criminal law, including legality and strict
construction.273 Thus, it is appropriate that the Rome Statute’s
crimes sometimes will cover a narrower swath of conduct than
IHL or international human rights norms.

greater or lesser generality and specificity and their validity may date back to
earlier or later moments in time.”).
269
ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 249, ¶ 251(4).
270
See supra Part IV.A.2.
271
See discussion supra note 193.
272
Davidson, supra note 147, at 395–400.
273
ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 249, ¶ 251(11)–(12).
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ICC judges can help to clarify the contours of the ICC crime
and the relationship between these fields of international law
through careful and clear decisions articulating where and why
the Rome Statute’s interpretation of ICL differs from the
underlying international human rights and IHL norms in certain
contexts. The ICC is uniquely positioned to play this role of
clarifying the law and, where appropriate, identifying
developments in ICL. In domestic jurisdictions, due to a lack of
familiarity with international law, the strange footing of
international law in the country’s law, or a state’s aversion to a
particular norm, judges are “likely to (and perhaps should) adopt
a cautious approach to developing the law.”274 By contrast, ICL,
IHL, and international human rights law, are the bread and
butter of all cases before the ICC, and ICC judges typically have
extensive backgrounds in at least one of these fields, and often
more than one.275 Thus, the ICC is likely to be in a better
position, from a resource, knowledge, and, in some
circumstances, political perspective, to identify the emergence of
new customary international law norms than most. A key
component in achieving this aim is transparent reasoning and
explicit customary international law and comparative criminal
law analysis in judgments.
D. Avoiding Case-Specific Crime Creation
Jeffries’s final caveat—that judges should avoid case-specific
lawmaking—bears particular consideration in the ICC context.
One of the justifications offered for judicial lawmaking in the
international criminal context—and the international context
generally—is the desire to give judges the flexibility to adapt to
changing circumstance and new and varied forms of harm.276
This interest stands in tension with this guideline of avoiding ad
hoc lawmaking in order to fit the law to the facts of a particular
case before the court.277 Judges must be mindful to take into
274

ILC CIL 1, supra note 18, at 37.
See
generally
Who’s
Who,
INT’L CRIM. CT.,
https://www.icccpi.int/about/judicial-divisions/biographies/Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 28,
2017).
276
See discussion supra note 13.
277
As Fletcher notes, “[t]he critical feature of these legislative warnings is that
they are systematic, abstracted from particular controversies, and well defined,”
which is why the “leading legal systems of the world converge in favoring legislation
as the primary source of criminal law.” FLETCHER, supra note 49, at 80–81.
275
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account changing circumstances in the world and warfare
generally, rather than the facts of a given conflict or defendant.
The international and hybrid tribunals have had a mixed record
on this score.278
In other words, judges should be thoughtful about how their
interpretations of crimes will apply beyond the case at hand.
This insight seems rather obvious and yet, it may be easier than
one thinks for judges to lose sight of this goal in the face of
atrocities, albeit ones that may not tidily fit into a particular
definition of the Rome Statute, and in the name of “closing the
impunity gap.”
Again, this Article offers an alternative
interpretation of the object and purpose of the Rome Statute—as
a tribunal that is charged with punishing those responsible for
grave international crimes in a manner consistent with the
defendant’s right to a fair trial.
This Article offers these guidelines as an alternative to
overly strict and unrealistic notions of lenity that require
ignoring sources of law in a manner inconsistent with Article 21
and to the prevailing reductionist and permissive vision of strict
construction of the ECtHR. The hope is that these guidelines are
clearer and better comport with the justifications for strict
construction in the ICC context, the strongest of which are notice,
respecting state intent—whether as an end in itself or for the
instrumental goal of encouraging state participation in the ICC
framework—promoting respect for human rights and the rule of
law, and helping to ensure that the court focus its limited
resources on grave crimes.
Finally, it explicitly and
transparently recognizes that the primary job of ICC judges is to
reach the best, rather than the narrowest, interpretation of the
Rome Statute, a document that is going to need some
interpreting.
The institutional design of the ICC helps to ensure that it
will not be overly aggressive in interpreting its crimes. At least
one commentator has argued that the ICC is a bad place for
lawmaking, because, unlike the ad hoc tribunals, it has
jurisdiction over the world’s future conflicts, rather than a
defined, largely past, regional conflict that involved crimes that
the international community has already recognized to be
sufficiently grave through the very creation of an ad hoc
278

See Davidson, supra note 147, at 413.
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tribunal.279 On the contrary, the ICC’s jurisdiction over future
crimes committed by a national of any state party or on the
territory of a state party, or by anyone, anywhere, should the
Security Council refer the matter to the court, makes it unlikely
the court will be too bold. Judges are well aware of the context in
which they operate. States parties have various tools, including
refusing to cooperate with the court, voicing their disagreement,
or, if they disagree strongly enough with an interpretation of a
crime, exiting from the Rome Statute treaty regime.280 This
institutional context, in conjunction with the statute’s gravity
requirements and the court’s resource constraints, is likely to put
powerful pressure on judges not to use expansive readings of the
law to take on marginal cases.
CONCLUSION
In sum, lenity comes last at the ICC, but strict construction
remains.
Though not all of the justifications for strict
construction apply as readily at the ICC as in domestic
jurisdictions, strict construction still implicates legitimate
concerns in the ICC context. To address these concerns, judges
should interpret the crimes in the Rome Statute in a manner
that avoids usurping the authority of states and unfairly
surprising defendants and that enhances the clarity of ICL. The
proposed conceptions of the “object and purpose” of the Rome
Statute and the role of customary international law and general
principles derived from national laws set out above can help
judges to navigate these guidelines and, ultimately, to make good
law.
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Lietzau, supra note 47, at 482.
See generally Wessel, supra note 59.

